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Abstract 
We use a novel dataset to study the relation between individual portfolio manager compensation 
and mutual fund performance. Managers with explicit performance-based pay exhibit superior 
subsequent fund performance, especially when investment advisors link pay to performance over 
a longer time period. In contrast, alternative compensation arrangements, such as fixed salary, 
assets-based pay, or advisor-profits-based pay are not associated with superior performance. Our 
tests further show that the positive relation between performance-based contracts and fund 
performance is not driven by the selection of talented managers proxied by education 
background. Lastly, managers with performance-based pay engage less in risk-shifting activities. 
 
JEL Classification: G23, J33 
Keywords: Portfolio manager compensation, mutual funds, fund performance, risk shifting 
                                                        
* This paper has benefited from comments and suggestions from Vikas Agarwal, Andrew Alfold, Jonathan Berk, 
Gennaro Bernile, Jules van Binsbergen, David Brown, Andrea Buffa, Jeff Busse, Mark Chen, Steve Dimmock, 
Roger Edelen, Alex Edmans, Richard Evans, Olubunmi Faleye, Fangjian Fu, Yaniv Grisntein, Martin Gruber, 
Jennifer Huang, Jiekun Huang, Lixin Huang, Sheng Huang, Wei Jiang, Jayant Kale, Omesh Kini, Marc Lipson, 
Roger Loh, Garen Markarian, Massimo Massa, Pedro Matos, Mitchell Petersen, Jeff Pontiff, Jonathan Reuter, Jay 
Ritter, Michael Ryngaert, Linda Schneider, Clemens Sialm, Juan Sotes-Paladino, Kevin Spellman, Anand 
Srinivasan, Laura Starks, Neal Stoughton, Dragon Tang, Melvyn Teo, Russ Wermers, Baozhong Yang, Tong Yao, 
Hayong Yun, and Fernando Zapatero. We thank seminar and conference participants at the 2015 China International 
Conference in Finance, 2014 Finance Down Under Conference, 2015 Financial Intermediation Research Society 
(FIRS) Conference, 2014 Jerusalem Finance Conference, 2013 SFS Finance Cavalcade, 2013 Singapore Scholars 
Symposium, 2015 WFA Annual Meeting, ESSEC Business School, Georgia State University, IE Business School, 
National Bank of Serbia, New York University, Renmin University of China, University of Florida, and University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. We are especially grateful to Lubos Pastor, Robert Stambaugh, and Luke Taylor 
for CRSP and Morningstar merged mutual fund data; Richard Evans for data on fund ticker creation date; and 
Martijn Cremers and Antti Petajisto for data on funds’ active share measure. We also thank Dhruv Boruah, Sangho 
Lee, Shai Shemesh, Jinfei Sheng, and Qinxi Wu for excellent research assistance. Tang acknowledges research 
support from the Ministry of Education of Singapore (Grant No. C207MSS13B002); Gómez acknowledges support 
from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant No. ECO2014-53022-R). Gómez thanks the 
Finance Department at New York University Stern School of Business for its hospitality.    
†  Linlin Ma, D’Amore-McKim School of Business, Northeastern University, 413D Hayden Hall, Boston, MA 
02115; tel. +1 617 373 4569; e-mail l.ma@neu.edu. 
‡ Yuehua Tang, Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University, 50 Stamford Road, #04-01, 
Singapore 178899; tel. +65 6808 5475; e-mail yhtang@smu.edu.sg. 
§ Juan-Pedro Gómez, IE Business School, María de Molina 12, 28006 Madrid, Spain; tel. +34 91 782 1326; e-mail 
juanp.gomez@ie.edu. 
1 
 
 
Portfolio Manager Compensation and Mutual Fund Performance 
 
1. Introduction 
Mutual funds are professionally managed investment vehicles that pool money from 
many investors to purchase securities such as stocks, bonds, and money market instruments. 
According to the Investment Company Institute, about half of all households in the United States 
invest in mutual funds, and the assets managed by them totaled $15 trillion at year-end 2013. 
Given the importance of mutual funds in the economy, understanding fund managers’ incentives 
is a key issue for academics, regulators, practitioners, and individual investors. Due to lack of 
data on individual fund manager incentives, the literature has focused primarily on the design of 
the advisory contracts between fund investors and investment advisors (i.e., asset management 
companies), and its implications for fund performance.1  Little is known about the layer of 
incentives that may more directly impact fund performance, that is, the compensation contracts 
of the actual decision makers – individual portfolio managers hired by advisors to manage the 
portfolio on a daily basis. 
In March 2005, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a new rule 
requiring mutual funds to disclose the compensation structure of their portfolio managers in the 
Statement of Additional Information (SAI).2 For instance, mutual funds need to disclose whether 
portfolio manager compensation is fixed or variable, and whether compensation is based on the 
fund’s investment performance and/or assets under management (AUM). For performance-based 
compensation, funds are required to identify any benchmark used to measure performance and to 
state the length of the period over which performance is measured. We analyze this mandatorily 
disclosed information in this paper to enhance our understanding of managerial incentives in the 
U.S. mutual fund industry and their effects on fund performance. 
                                                        
1 See, e.g., Starks (1987), Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Golec (1992), Tufano and Sevick (1997), Coles, Suay, and 
Woodbury (2000), Deli (2002), Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003), Golec and Starks (2004), Dass, Massa, and Patgiri 
(2008), Massa and Patgiri (2009), and Warner and Wu (2011). 
2  See SEC Rule S7-12-04, Disclosure Regarding Portfolio Managers of Registered Management Investment 
Companies, http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8458.htm. 
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We hand-collect the information on portfolio manager compensation structures from the 
SAIs for a sample of over 3,400 U.S. open-end mutual funds over the period 2006–2011. We 
uncover the following stylized facts. First, unlike the formulistic AUM-based advisory contract 
(see, e.g., Coles, Suay, and Woodbury, 2000; Deli, 2002; Warner and Wu, 2011), individual 
portfolio manager compensation is not formula-based. Second, 98.6% of sample funds report 
that their portfolio managers receive variable bonus-type compensation as opposed to fixed 
salary. Third, the bonus component of compensation is explicitly tied to the fund’s investment 
performance for 79.2% of sample funds. The performance evaluation window ranges from one 
quarter to ten years, and the average evaluation window is three years. Finally, we find that for 
about half the sample, the manager’s bonus is directly linked to the overall profitability of the 
advisor. Only 18.9% of sample funds explicitly mention that the advisor considers the fund’s 
AUM when deciding manager bonuses.3  These stylized facts contrast with the evidence on 
advisory contracts, in which AUM-based advisory fees are the predominant structure, and 
performance-based compensation is rarely observed (e.g., Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 2003). 
We next examine the relation between portfolio managers’ compensation contracts and 
mutual fund performance. We hypothesize that explicit performance-based pay is associated with 
superior fund performance. There are broadly two alternative, yet not mutually exclusive 
explanations for this hypothesis. First, as predicted by agency theory (e.g., Li and Tiwari, 2009), 
performance-based contracts induce portfolio managers to exert more effort. Alternatively, 
theory based on information asymmetry suggests that advisors may screen out better managers 
by offering performance-based contracts (e.g., Heinkel and Soughton, 1994) or that skilled 
portfolio managers may negotiate performance-based contracts to signal their ability (e.g., Das 
and Sundaram, 2002). In either case, we expect that, other things being equal, funds with 
performance-based portfolio manager compensation exhibit better performance compared to 
funds without such compensation scheme. 
To test this empirical prediction, we relate portfolio manager compensation structures to 
subsequent fund performance. We use alpha measures estimated using both gross and net-of-fee 
                                                        
3 Performance-based, AUM-based, and advisor-profits-based pay structures are not necessarily mutually exclusive in 
portfolio manager compensation. 
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fund returns (henceforth referred to as gross and net alphas, respectively) to evaluate 
performance. While net alpha measures the abnormal return to fund investors net of fees and 
expenses, gross alpha measures the pre-expense abnormal return and is arguably better suited to 
assess the effect of portfolio manager incentives on fund performance. To make our analysis 
comparable to the extant mutual fund literature, we first analyze a sample of actively managed 
diversified domestic equity funds and measure their performance using gross and net Carhart 
(1997) four-factor alphas. Next, we form a more comprehensive sample which consists of 
diversified domestic equity funds, sector funds, bond funds, balanced funds, and global funds 
(referred to as the full sample hereafter). For this sample of funds, we measure fund performance 
using gross and net six-factor alphas, estimated using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model 
augmented with a bond factor and an international factor (e.g., Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 2007; 
Chen, Hong, Jiang, and Kubik, 2013).  
Consistent with the hypothesis, we find that, in the full sample, managers with 
performance-based pay subsequently outperform managers without such incentive by 86.0 (88.5) 
basis points per annum as measured by gross (net) six-factor alpha. For the subsample of 
diversified domestic equity funds, the outperformance is 69.0 (71.7) basis points per annum 
based on gross (net) four-factor alpha. Such an outperformance is both statistically and 
economically significant. The fact that we find similar evidence on both gross and net alphas also 
suggests that the outperformance created by managers on a pre-expense basis gets passed on to 
fund investors, rather than extracted by fund advisors (e.g., by charging higher fees). In contrast, 
we do not find that alternative compensation arrangements, such as fixed salary, AUM-based, or 
advisor-profits-based compensation are associated with superior subsequent performance. We 
further carry out a “horse race” (i.e., F-tests) among various compensation structures and find 
that managers with performance-based pay outperform managers with fixed salary, AUM-based 
pay, or advisor-profits-based pay for both the diversified domestic equity fund sample and the 
full sample.  
As required by the SEC, if portfolio manager compensation is directly linked to fund 
performance, the fund must disclose the length of the period over which performance is 
measured, which we refer to as the “evaluation period.” Short evaluation periods may damage 
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fund performance, because they induce managers to engage in such activities as risk shifting and 
window dressing to boost short-term performance. Longer evaluation periods can mitigate the 
problem of “short-termism” and help identify and reward managerial skill rather than luck. 
However, too long an evaluation period can protect managers from dismissal in the short-run and 
induce self-serving behavior such as shirking and herding, which is detrimental to fund 
performance. Therefore, it is an empirical issue as to whether and how evaluation period is 
associated with fund performance. 
We focus on the sample of funds that comply with the SEC rule and disclose the 
evaluation period together with the evaluation benchmark. Our empirical analysis shows a 
positive relation between evaluation period and fund performance for both the domestic equity 
fund sample and the full sample. This positive relation is both statistically and economically 
significant. A one-standard-deviation (i.e., 1.2 years) increase in the average evaluation period is 
associated with an improvement of 28.2 (27.4) basis points in annualized gross (net) four-factor 
alpha for the domestic equity fund sample, and 36.4 (34.6) basis points in annualized gross (net) 
six-factor alpha for the full sample. In addition, we find similar results across two subsamples 
partitioned by median portfolio manager tenure. This finding suggests that our results are not 
driven by a survivorship bias whereby managers with longer tenure are associated with both 
longer evaluation period and better performance. 
Our evidence thus far shows that managers with performance-based compensation exhibit 
superior fund performance, especially when advisors link pay to performance over a longer time 
period. We conduct several additional tests to assess the robustness of our findings. First, we 
obtain similar results if we control for funds’ liquidity exposure using the Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2003) liquidity factor. Second, our results are robust to controlling for funds’ strategy activeness 
using Cremers and Petajisto’s (2009) active share measure. Lastly, our results remain 
qualitatively similar if we add family average performance (excluding the fund itself) in the 
regressions to control for family impact on fund performance. All together, these results help 
alleviate the endogeneity concern that certain  fund  strategies  (e.g.,  with  illiquid  assets  or  
high  active  share) or family characteristics may positively relate to both the use of performance-
based pay and fund performance.  
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Our last set of tests investigates the channels through which performance-based pay 
relates to superior performance by studying several explanations proposed in the literature on 
portfolio delegation based on agency theory, information asymmetry, and risk-shifting incentives. 
First, we test whether the positive relation between performance-based pay and fund 
performance is driven by inducing managerial effort or by the selection of talented managers 
(either through screening or signaling), or by a combination of both. While it is challenging to 
completely disentangle these explanations, we investigate whether one of them dominates. 
Specifically, we follow Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and include two proxies of managerial 
talent (i.e., the average SAT score at the manager’s undergraduate institution and whether the 
manager has an MBA from a top business school) as additional explanatory variables. We find 
that our baseline results on performance-based pay and evaluation period remain largely 
unchanged. To the extent that education is a valid proxy for managers’ ability (either innate or 
through better education), this evidence appears rather consistent with the effort induction 
explanation than with the talent selection alternative. In addition, we find no evidence that 
managers with longer tenure are more likely to be compensated with performance-based 
contracts, which is inconsistent with the prediction of the asymmetric information model by 
Heinkel and Stoughton (1994). 
Next, we study how portfolio manager compensation structures affect fund risk-shifting 
behavior. 4  Given that risk-shifting is detrimental to fund performance (Huang, Sialm, and 
Zhang, 2011), this could be another venue through which performance-based contracts relate to 
better fund performance. We examine portfolio managers’ intra-year risk-shifting behavior using 
the stock holdings of diversified domestic equity funds (e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996; 
Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele, 2009). We find that managers with 
performance-based pay engage less in risk-shifting activities compared to managers without such 
incentive. In addition, conditional on receiving performance-based pay, managers with longer 
evaluation periods are associated with less risk shifting than those with shorter evaluation 
                                                        
4  The prediction in the theoretical literature is inconclusive. Grinblatt and Titman (1989) argue that convex, 
performance-based contracts lead to value-destroying risk-shifting incentives. Carpenter (2000), Ross (2004), and 
Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007), among others, challenge this relation and show that convex contracts do not 
necessarily lead to higher incentives for risk shifting.   
6 
 
 
periods. Taken together, our evidence suggests that higher effort induction and lower risk shifting 
are two potential channels through which performance-based contracts relate to superior fund 
performance. 
Our paper contributes to the vast literature on managerial incentives in the U.S. mutual 
fund industry. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to empirically study individual 
portfolio manager compensation based on SEC mandatory disclosures.5 The literature has thus 
far focused on advisory contracts between fund shareholders and investment advisors (see 
footnote 1). Our paper shifts the focus to within the investment advisors and examines the 
compensation structures of individual portfolio managers, an area overlooked but critical to 
understand the incentives of mutual fund portfolio managers. Overall, our study suggests that 
mandatory disclosure of portfolio manager compensation is of great value in assessing 
managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry. 
It is well documented in the prior literature that explicit performance-based incentives 
rarely exist in advisory contracts (e.g., Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 2003; Golec and Starks, 2004), 
likely due to the fact that advisory contracts are prohibited from having asymmetric incentive 
fees. In the meanwhile, there is an extensive literature that studies the implicit incentives 
embedded in the convex relationship between fund flows and performance.6 These two pieces of 
evidence seem to indicate that the U.S. mutual fund industry relies mainly on implicit flow 
incentives to induce managerial effort. In contrast to this view, our study shows that, as predicted 
by agency theory (e.g., Li and Tiwari, 2009), explicit, option-type performance-based incentive 
contracts exist in the U.S. mutual fund industry and are associated with superior fund 
performance. In particular, we document that, in an unregulated setting, asymmetric, option-like 
performance-based incentives are the dominant form of compensation for portfolio managers. 
This stylized fact provides guidance for theoretical models on portfolio delegation in the asset 
management industry (e.g., Basak and Pavlova, 2013; Buffa, Vayanos, and Woolley, 2014)). 
                                                        
5  Farnsworth and Taylor (2006) use survey data from 396 portfolio managers to analyze the determinants of 
portfolio manager compensation structures. Given the nature of the data, their study is subject to self-reporting bias 
and sample selection bias. In addition, they do not study performance implications of compensation contracts.  
6 See, e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Basak, 
Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007, 2008), Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007), and Sialm, Starks, and Zhang (2015). Also see 
Spiegel and Zhang (2013) and Goldstein, Jiang, and Ng (2015) for evidence on non-convex flow-performance 
relationship of equity and bond mutual funds, respectively.  
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Furthermore, these explicit performance-based incentives are associated with superior fund 
performance, which echoes the evidence in Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) on managerial 
incentives in the hedge fund industry, and Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003) on performance-based 
advisory contracts.   
Our paper also makes a unique contribution to the literature on performance evaluation of 
mutual fund managers. While it is not uncommon for prior literature to assume that mutual fund 
managers are evaluated based on their annual performance, we uncover that the most prevalent 
performance evaluation window is three-year. Further, we document that there is a positive 
relation between evaluation period and fund performance. This finding is novel not only to the 
mutual fund literature but also to the broader literature that studies executive compensation.7  
Lastly, our study is related to the literature on mutual fund risk taking in response to 
managerial incentives. Prior studies show that implicit incentives embedded in the convex flow-
performance relationship may give rise to agency conflicts as they induce fund managers to 
engage in intra-year risk-shifting activities. 8  Our study suggests that certain compensation 
contracts of portfolio managers, particularly performance-based contracts with longer evaluation 
period, can reduce such risk-shifting behavior.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional 
background. Section 3 presents the data, variable construction, and sample description. Section 4 
examines the effects of portfolio manager compensation on fund performance and Section 5 
studies the underlying channels for such effects. Section 6 sets forth our conclusions. 
 
2. Institutional background 
Mandated by the Investment Company Act of 1940, mutual funds have a distinctive 
organizational structure. A typical mutual fund consists of fund shareholders and a board of 
directors. Shareholders, who are the owners of the funds, have specific voting rights to elect a 
                                                        
7 A related paper by Gopalan, Milbourn, Song, and Thakor (2014) studies the determinants of executive pay duration 
and shows that some stock and option grants in executive pay are contingent on future firm performance over 
difference horizons.  
8 See, e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Koski and Pontiff (1999), Busse 
(2001), Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007), Kempf and Ruenzi (2008), Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009), Hu, 
Kale, Pagani, and Subramanian (2011), and Schwarz (2012). 
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board of directors that represents their interests. The board of directors is legally empowered to 
govern the fund. Its primary responsibility is to review and approve the advisory contract with an 
investment advisor (i.e., the asset management company) for the fund’s management. Portfolio 
managers, who are employees of the investment advisor, make the day-to-day investment 
decisions for the fund. Selection, compensation, and removal of portfolio managers occur at the 
advisor’s discretion. 
Investment advisors are compensated through advisory fees for providing portfolio 
management services to fund shareholders. In most cases, the advisory fee is specified as a 
percentage of the fund’s total net assets (e.g., Deli, 2002; Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 2003; Golec 
and Starks, 2004). Only a small proportion (less than 5%) of mutual funds compensates their 
investment advisors using incentive fees based on fund investment performance relative to a pre-
specified benchmark. The advisory contract between fund shareholders and the investment 
advisor is constrained by regulation, which prohibits asymmetric incentive fees. According to 
section 205 (a) (1) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the incentive fees received by an 
investment advisor must be symmetric relative to the benchmark, with any increase in fees for 
above-benchmark performance matched by a symmetric decrease in fees for below-benchmark 
performance. In contrast, the compensation contract between the investment advisor and 
portfolio managers, which we examine in this study, is not subject to this regulatory restriction.9 
While the advisory contract between fund shareholders and the investment advisor has 
been disclosed to the investors for decades (e.g., via the SEC N-SAR Form), little is known 
about the compensation contract between investment advisors and portfolio managers. Since 
March 2005, the SEC has required mutual funds to disclose in their SAIs the structure of their 
portfolio managers’ compensation and the method used to determine it. This new disclosure 
requirement is part of a series of regulations the SEC introduced in 2004 to improve the 
transparency of the mutual fund industry and to help investors better understand portfolio 
managers’ incentives. 
                                                        
9  In an SEC memorandum enclosed with Congressional Correspondence on Mutual Funds and Derivative 
Instruments dated September 26, 1994, footnote 35 states that “the Investment Advisors of 1940 prohibits most 
types of performance fees for registered investment advisers, but this prohibition does not apply to the compensation 
arrangements that investment advisers have with their employees, including mutual fund portfolio managers.”   
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Per the disclosure requirement, portfolio manager compensation includes, without 
limitation, salary, bonus, deferred compensation, and whether the compensation is cash or non-
cash. For each type of compensation, a fund is required to specifically describe the criteria on 
which such compensation is based: for example, whether the compensation is fixed, whether 
(and how) compensation is based on the fund’s pre- or after-tax performance over a certain 
period, and whether (and how) compensation is based on the value of assets held in the fund’s 
portfolio. In the case of a performance-based bonus, a fund is required to identify any benchmark 
used to measure performance and to state the length of the period over which performance is 
measured. It is important to note that mutual funds are required to disclose only the criteria upon 
which compensation is based, and not the dollar value of compensation received by portfolio 
managers. 
 
3. Data, variables, and sample overview 
3.1. Data 
We construct our sample from several data sources. Our first data source is the 
Morningstar Direct Mutual Fund database, which covers U.S. open-end mutual funds and 
includes information about fund names, fund net-of-fee returns, AUM, inception dates, expense 
ratios, turnover ratios, investment objectives, fund tickers, benchmark portfolios, portfolio 
manager names, advisor names, fund family, and other fund characteristics. We also collect data 
on fund managers’ education backgrounds (e.g., undergraduate institution attended and MBA 
degrees, if any) from the manager biographical information obtained from Morningstar. Recent 
studies by Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) and Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015) show that 
there are certain discrepancies in mutual fund data between Morningstar and CRSP mutual fund 
databases. To ensure data accuracy, we only retain in our sample the funds in the Morningstar 
and CRSP merged database of Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015).10  
Our sample covers diversified domestic equity funds, sector funds, bond funds, balanced 
funds, global funds, and funds in miscellaneous categories such as alternative strategy funds. We 
                                                        
10 Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015) create a CRSP and Morningstar merged mutual fund data and check the 
accuracy of the matched data across the two databases. See the Data Appendix of their paper for detailed matching 
and cleaning procedures: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor/research/Data_Appendix_Aug_2013_V3.pdf. 
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exclude money market funds and closed-end funds from our sample. We identify and exclude 
index funds using their names as well as Morningstar and CRSP index fund identifiers.11 We also 
exclude funds with multiple investment advisors. Following Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001), 
Chen, Hong, Huang, Kubik (2004), and Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015), we exclude funds 
with less than $15 million in TNA (total net assets). We further use data on fund ticker creation 
date to address incubation bias (Evans, 2010).12  For funds with multiple share classes, we 
compute fund-level variables by aggregating across the different share classes. Specifically, we 
calculate total AUM as the sum of assets across all share classes and compute the value-weighted 
average of other fund characteristics across share classes. 
Another main data source is the SEC EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and 
Retrieval) database. We retrieve from EDGAR the SAI for each fund in our sample for each year 
from 2006 to 2011. We then manually collect the information on the structure of and the method 
used to determine the compensation of portfolio managers. We relate these compensation 
structures to fund performance in the year following the SAI year. Moreover, we obtain advisory 
fee information contained in the N-SAR filings available via EDGAR. The N-SAR data set is 
then matched by fund ticker and fund name to the Morningstar database. 
Finally, we obtain stock holdings of domestic equity funds in our sample from the 
Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings database, which contains the quarterly equity holdings 
of U.S. open-end mutual funds. We merge our sample of domestic equity funds and Thomson 
Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings database using the MFLINKS tables (e.g., Wermers, 2000).  
 
                                                        
11 Similar to Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015), we remove funds with Morningstar index fund indicator equal 
“Yes” or CRSP index fund flag equal to “D” (pure index fund) or “E” (enhanced index fund). We also exclude from 
our sample funds whose names contain any of the following text strings: Index, Ind, Idx, Indx, Mkt, Market, 
Composite, S&P, SP, Russell, Nasdaq, DJ, Dow, Jones, Wilshire, NYSE, iShares, SPDR, HOLDRs, ETF, Exchange-
Traded Fund, PowerShares, StreetTRACKS, 100, 400, 500, 600, 1000, 1500, 2000, 3000, 5000 (e.g., Busse and 
Tong, 2012; Busse, Jiang, and Tang, 2014; Ferson and Lin, 2014; Kostovetsky and Warner, 2015).  
12 We address incubation bias as follows. First, as in Evans (2010), we use fund ticker creation date to identify funds 
that are incubated (i.e., when the difference between the earliest ticker creation date and the date of the first reported 
monthly return is greater than 12 months). If a fund is classified as incubated, we eliminate all data before the ticker 
creation date. Second, the ticker creation date data end in January 2008. After that, we obtain the first date in which 
a fund reports its ticker in Form N-SAR filed to the SEC, which is close to or later than the ticker creation date. We 
use this N-SAR ticker report date and the same 12 months cutoff to identify funds are potentially incubated and 
remove the first 3 years of return history for these funds as suggested by Evans (2010). Our two-step procedure 
minimizes the cost of eliminating useful data for non-incubated funds. 
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3.2. Variable construction 
3.2.1. Compensation structures 
As discussed above, mutual funds are not required to disclose the actual dollar amount of 
compensation received by their portfolio managers. Instead, they must disclose only the structure 
of and the method used to determine portfolio manager compensation. To capture the different 
aspects of compensation structures of portfolio managers, we construct the following variables. 
Note that, except for Fixed Salary, the variables that describe compensation structures are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. 
Fixed Salary: Portfolio manager compensation can be a fixed salary or a fixed salary plus 
a variable component, commonly referred to as a bonus. To differentiate between these two types 
of compensation structure, we use an indicator variable, Fixed Salary, which equals one if the 
portfolio manager’s compensation is fixed, and zero if the compensation has both fixed and 
variable components. 
Performance Pay: For those portfolio managers who have both a fixed salary and a 
variable bonus, the SEC requires the fund to disclose whether the bonus is based on the fund’s 
investment performance. The indicator variable Performance Pay equals one if the bonus is 
explicitly linked to fund performance, zero otherwise. 
Evaluation Period: In the case of a performance-based bonus, a fund is required to state 
the length of the period over which performance is measured. In many cases, funds report 
multiple evaluation periods such as “one-, three-, and five-year window”. We construct the 
following variables: Evaluation Period Min, which takes the value, in years, of the shortest 
evaluation window, and Evaluation Period Max, which takes the value, in years, of the longest 
evaluation window. Evaluation Period Median is the median evaluation window if there are 
three or more evaluation periods disclosed. Evaluation Period Mean is calculated as the mean of 
the shortest and longest evaluation periods. 
AUM Pay: For those portfolio managers who have both a fixed salary and a variable 
bonus, the SEC requires the fund to disclose whether the bonus is based on the value of assets 
held in the fund’s portfolio. We construct an indicator variable, AUM Pay, which equals one if 
the portfolio manager’s compensation is explicitly tied to fund AUM, zero otherwise. 
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Advisor-Profits Pay: Similar to Performance Pay and AUM Pay, we construct an 
indicator variable, Advisor-Profits Pay, which takes the value of one if portfolio manager 
compensation is explicitly tied to overall profits of the investment advisor, zero otherwise. 
3.2.2. Family, advisor, and manager characteristics 
Family Size: The sum of total net assets of all the funds in the family.  
Subadvisor: Following Chen, Hong, Jiang, and Kubik (2013), a fund is categorized as 
externally subadvised (outsourced) if the investment advisor or subadvisor managing the 
portfolio is not affiliated with the mutual fund family. The SEC defines “affiliated” as either 
ownership of or some controlling interests in the other party. We first check the family name and 
advisor name (both obtained from N-SAR filings). When the two names do not match, we use 
the information in the fund’s SAI to check whether there exists any affiliation between the two. 
The variable Subadvisor is set to one if there is no affiliation between the mutual fund family and 
the investment advisor; zero otherwise. 
Owner: This is an indicator variable that equals one if the portfolio manager is the 
founder, controlling owner, principal partner, or blockholder of the investment advisor, zero 
otherwise. In other words, a positive value of Owner indicates that at least one of the portfolio 
managers working for the fund has vested interests in the investment advisor. We obtain this 
information from the portfolio manager biography description in the SAI. 
Team Mgmt.: This is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is managed by a team 
of portfolio managers and zero if the fund is managed by a single manager. 
Manager Tenure: This variable is defined as the number of months that a manager(s) has 
been at the helm of a mutual fund.  
Manager Education: We manually collect portfolio managers’ education backgrounds, 
including their undergraduate institutions and MBA degrees if any, from manager biography in 
the Morningstar database. Similar to Chevalier and Ellison (1999), we construct two education 
variables to proxy for managers’ ability: (i) the average composite SAT score at the managers’ 
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undergraduate institution (SAT), and (ii) an indicator variable, Top MBA, that equals one if the 
portfolio manager holds an MBA degree from a top business school.13  
Manager Experience: We construct this measure of portfolio managers’ industry 
experience as the interval between sample year and the year when a manager first appears in the 
Morningstar Direct database. In the case where a fund is managed by a team of portfolio 
managers, we calculate Manager Tenure, Manager Education and Manager Experience by 
taking the average of these variables across all team members.     
3.2.3. Fund characteristics 
Fund Performance: We use both gross and net alphas to evaluate fund performance. 
Gross alpha is the more relevant measure for our study since it captures the abnormal return 
before fund expenses are deducted and is arguably better suited to assess the effect of portfolio 
manager incentives on fund performance. We also examine fund net alpha as it measures the 
abnormal return delivered to fund investors after fees and expenses. 
For the sample of diversified domestic equity funds, we estimate Gross Four-Factor 
Alpha (Net Four-Factor Alpha) using monthly fund gross (net) returns with the Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model, which adjusts for market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors. For 
the full sample of funds, we estimate Gross Six-Factor Alpha (Net Six-Factor Alpha) using 
monthly fund gross (net) returns with a six-factor model that augments the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model with a bond factor (Barclays U.S. Aggregate Bond Index) and an international 
factor (MSCI World Ex U.S. Index). Similar factor models are used in prior studies such as 
Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2007) and Chen, Hong, Jiang, and Kubik (2013). Fund monthly gross 
returns are calculated by adding back 1/12th of the annual expense ratio to monthly net returns.  
Specifically, for each of the alpha measures, we first estimate the factor loadings using 
the preceding 24 monthly fund returns (gross or net):  
𝑅𝑖,𝑠 = ?̂?𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ ?̂?𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−1𝐹𝑘,𝑠
𝑁
𝑘=1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑠,   𝑠 = 𝑡 − 24, … , 𝑡 − 1                        (1) 
                                                        
13 The SAT information is obtained from the College Board: https://www.collegeboard.org/. We use the SAT score at 
the end of our sample period, that is, as of the year of 2012. We define top business schools as those in the top 5% 
based on the average GMAT score in 2012 (i.e., average GMAT score>700). 
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where s and t indicate months, i indicates funds, 𝑅𝑖 is the monthly excess return of fund i over 
one-month T-bill rate, and F is the monthly returns of the four or six factors. We then calculate 
monthly out-of-sample alpha as the difference between a fund’s return (gross or net) in a given 
month and the sum of the product of the estimated factor loadings and the factor returns during 
that month: 
𝛼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − ∑ ?̂?𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−1𝐹𝑘,𝑡.
𝑁
𝑘=1
                                                              (2) 
We average the monthly alphas within a year and multiply it by 12 to obtain an 
annualized alpha measure. Later in our analysis, we also follow the same procedure to estimate 
gross and net five-factor (seven-factor) alphas with monthly return data by adding Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor to the four-factor (six-factor) model. 
We consider several alpha measures estimated using alternative methodologies in our 
robustness tests. First, we use daily fund return data to estimate in-sample four-factor and six-
factor alphas (e.g., Bollen and Busse, 2001, 2005). In particular, we estimate gross and net four-
factor (six-factor) alphas each year using daily (gross or net) fund return data with the Carhart 
(1997) four-factor (six-factor) model. We calculate fund daily gross returns by adding back 
1/252th of the annual expense ratio to the daily net returns. To capture any effect of infrequent 
trading on daily fund returns (e.g., Scholes and Williams, 1977; Dimson, 1979), we include both 
contemporaneous and lagged daily factor returns in the regressions, following Bollen and Busse 
(2001, 2005) and Busse and Tong (2012). We annualize the daily alpha estimate by (1+daily 
alpha)252 –1. Moreover, for our analysis on the full sample, we estimate a benchmark-adjusted 
alpha by regressing monthly excess returns of a fund on the excess returns of its Morningstar-
assigned benchmark (i.e., Morningstar Category Index) for each calendar year.14 We annualize 
the benchmark-adjusted alpha by multiplying it by 12.  
                                                        
14  Morningstar assigns each fund to a Morningstar Category and designates a benchmark portfolio, namely 
Morningstar Category Index, to each category. We follow Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015) and use it to 
estimate a benchmark-adjusted performance measure. Since Morningstar assigns categories based on funds’ 
holdings instead of the objectives reported in the prospectus, this benchmark does not suffer from the cherry-picking 
bias documented in Sensoy (2009). 
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Risk Shifting: For the sample of diversified domestic equity funds, we analyze funds’ 
intra-year risk-shifting behavior (e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 
1997; Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele, 2009). In particular, we follow Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele 
(2009) and use fund portfolio holdings to construct the risk shift ratio: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2,𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
1⁄ .                                                    (3) 
For fund i in year t, we compute the intended portfolio risk variable, 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2,𝑖𝑛𝑡, in the second half of 
the year based on the actual portfolio weights in the second half of the year and the volatility of a 
stock in the first half of the year. We then calculate the intended risk shift ratio as in Eq. (3) by 
taking the ratio of the intended portfolio risk in the second half of the year, 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2,𝑖𝑛𝑡 , and the 
realized portfolio risk in the first half of the year, 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
1 , computed from the actual portfolio weights 
and stock volatility in the first half of the year. We use the standard deviation of 26 weekly fund 
returns to measure fund volatility for each half-year period. By design, this measure captures the 
effect of active changes in portfolio composition in the second half of the year and is unaffected 
by changes in stock volatility.  
Advisory Contract Features: Performance Adv. Fee is a dummy variable that equals one 
if the fund employs a fulcrum advisory fee, which rewards and penalizes the advisor for the 
fund’s investment performance, zero otherwise (Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 2003). Following 
Massa and Patgiri (2009), Coles Incentive Rate is defined as the difference between the last and 
first marginal advisory fee rates divided by the effective marginal advisory fee rate, all as a 
percentage of fund AUM. A value of zero for this measure represents a linear advisory fee 
schedule. Coles Incentive Rate takes negative values for concave advisory fee structures. 
Other Variables: Fund Size is the sum of AUM across all share classes of the fund; Fund 
Age is the age of the oldest share class in the fund; Expense is determined by dividing the fund’s 
operating expenses by the average dollar value of its AUM; Turnover is defined as the minimum 
of sales or purchases divided by total net assets of the fund; Net Flows is the annual average of 
monthly net growth in fund assets beyond reinvested dividends (Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Lastly, 
Active Share is calculated by aggregating the absolute differences between the weight of a 
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portfolio’s actual holdings and the weight of its closest matching index (Cremers and Petajisto, 
2009). It captures the percentage of a fund’s portfolio that differs from its benchmark index.  
 
3.3. Sample overview 
Our final sample consists of 3,453 unique mutual funds from 412 fund families, covering 
15,605 fund-year observations (henceforth, the full sample). These observations are evenly 
distributed across the sample period of 2006–2011. The sample distributions across investment 
categories are as follows: diversified domestic equity funds (37.5%), bond funds (30.0%), global 
funds (14.2%), balanced funds (8.7%), sector funds (8.2%), and other funds (1.5%). To facilitate 
the comparison with the previous literature on diversified U.S. domestic equity funds, we 
separately analyze such funds in our study (henceforth, the equity fund sample). In particular, we 
have 1,311 unique diversified U.S. domestic equity funds from 328 fund families with a total of 
5,845 fund-year observations over the 2006-2011 period.15  
We report summary statistics of portfolio manager compensation structures for the full 
sample in Table 1 (see Table A1 of the Internet Appendix for summary statistics of the equity 
fund sample). Overall, we find that the reported compensation structure is subjective and 
discretionary rather than objective and formula-based. In general, this finding is consistent with 
the survey evidence documented by Farnsworth and Taylor (2006). Fixed salary is rarely 
observed in the sample. Only 1.4% of funds in the full sample claim that their managers’ 
compensation does not vary with any factor. In the vast majority of cases, portfolio manager 
compensation consists of both a fixed base salary and a variable component, namely, a bonus. 
The weights of the base salary and the bonus in total compensation, however, are generally not 
available, since the SEC does not require this information to be disclosed. Based on a small 
proportion of funds that voluntarily release information on bonus size relative to base salary, we 
observe that the bonus can be as large as one to three times the base salary. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
                                                        
15 We note that the sample size of diversified domestic equity funds is slightly smaller than some of the prior studies 
since we require funds in our sample to (i) have portfolio manager compensation data available in SAI, (ii) be in the 
Morningstar and CRSP merged database of Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015), and (iii) can be marched to 
Thomson Reuters Holdings database. Nevertheless, our domestic equity sample is overall representative based on 
fund characteristics.  
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We find that for 79.2% of our sample funds, portfolio manager compensation is directly 
tied to fund investment performance. We observe that the performance-based incentive is 
asymmetric: advisors reward managers for outperformance relative to the assigned benchmark, 
but do not penalize them for underperformance. As for the length of the period over which 
investment performance is measured, we observe that the vast majority of funds report multiple 
evaluation periods (e.g., one-, three-, and five-year windows). The average evaluation window is 
about three years on a rolling-window basis. The variation in evaluation periods is significant, 
with the longest evaluation window being ten years and the shortest being one quarter. 
Contrary to the pattern in advisory contracts, in the majority of cases, portfolio manager 
compensation is not explicitly tied to the fund’s AUM. Only 18.9% of funds in our sample 
explicitly mention that the investment advisor considers the fund’s AUM when deciding the 
bonus in portfolio manager compensation. Moreover, we find that for 48.7% of our sample 
funds, portfolio manager compensation is explicitly stated to be linked to the profitability of the 
investment advisor. Arguably, these portfolio managers’ compensation is indirectly tied to the 
AUM of the fund, since advisor profitability depends on the advisory fee rates and total AUM of 
the advisor. We note that the prevalence of actual bonuses based on the advisor’s profits may be 
underestimated because it is not required to be disclosed by the SEC. 
As mentioned above, performance-based, AUM-based, and advisor-profits-based 
incentives are not mutually exclusive when compensating a portfolio manager. We further break 
down the distribution of these three types of bonus in Panel B of Table 1. We find that, out of 
15,393 fund-year observations that include variable compensation, 5,733 (37.2%) offer managers 
a bonus based only on investment performance; 133 (0.9%) offer a bonus based only on AUM; 
and 2,128 (13.8%) offer a bonus based only on advisor profits. For the remaining funds of the 
sample, managers receive some combinations of the three types of bonus. There are 1,566 
(10.2%) cases where managers receive all three types of bonus simultaneously, and there are 716 
(4.7%) cases where the manager’s compensation is entirely subjective and does not depend on 
any specific stated factor. These results speak to the empirical relevance of performance-based 
bonuses, both in isolation and in combination with other incentives. 
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We find that cross-sectional variation in portfolio manager compensation structure arises 
mainly at the fund family or advisor level (a given family may have more than one advisor if one 
or more funds are outsourced to an unaffiliated subadvisor). In particular, we find that only 101 
(24) out of 412 families (644 advisors) exhibit some within-family (within-advisor) variation in 
the compensation features that we examine. In the case of team-managed funds, we do not 
observe much variation in the structure of compensation for different managers working for the 
same fund. The only exception is when one manager in a team is the controlling owner of the 
advisory firm. In such cases, we consider only the owner’s compensation structure in our 
analysis. Given this data structure, we conduct our analysis at the fund level and cluster the 
standard errors at the family level in all our regression specifications to account for the within-
family residual cross-correlation (Petersen, 2009). We also observe that portfolio manager 
compensation structures rarely change over time during our sample period (see Table A2 of the 
Internet Appendix).  
In Table 2, we report summary statistics of family, advisor, manager, and fund 
characteristics. An average fund in our sample has about $1.6 billion AUM, a 15-year history, a 
1.2% expense ratio, and an 89.8% turnover ratio. Such fund is part of a family of funds with a 
total of $136.9 billion AUM. The average manager tenure is 5.8 years. About 30.8% of the 
sample funds have at least one manager with an MBA degree from a top business school. On 
average, managers attended an undergraduate institution with an average student SAT score of 
1,306 and have about 10 years of industry experience. For 17.9% of our sample funds, there is at 
least one portfolio manager who is the controlling owner of the investment advisor. Similar to 
the evidence of Chen, Hong, Jiang, and Kubik (2013) and Kostovetsky and Warner (2015), 
18.5% of sample funds are managed by an unaffiliated subadvisor.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Jensen, 1968; Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 1996; 
Carhart, 1997; Wermers, 2000; Fama and French, 2010; Elton and Gruber, 2013), U.S. mutual 
funds typically have negative factor model alphas on a net-of-fee basis. For the equity fund 
sample, the average (median) annualized net four-factor alpha is -0.87% (-0.84%); for the full 
sample, the average (median) annualized net six-factor alpha are -0.31% (-0.35%). We also find 
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similar evidence for all the alternative alpha measures we consider in our robustness tests (see 
Table A3 of the Internet Appendix). As for the gross-of-fee fund performance, the averages of 
gross four-factor alpha of diversified domestic equity funds and gross six-factor alpha of the full 
sample are both positive. The mean risk shift ratio of our domestic equity fund sample is 1.03. 
Similar to Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003), we find that only 4.6% of funds have symmetric 
performance-incentive fees in the advisory contract. Finally, the average Coles Incentive Rate 
measure is -0.12 (i.e., a concave advisory fee structure), which is close to the mean value 
reported in Massa and Patgiri (2009). 
 
4. Portfolio manager compensation and fund performance 
In this section, we study the impact of individual portfolio manager compensation on 
mutual fund performance. In Section 4.1, we examine the performance difference between 
managers with and without performance-based compensation. In Section 4.2, we further compare 
the performance difference among different compensation arrangements. In Section 4.3, we 
examine the relation between evaluation period and fund performance. Section 4.4 presents 
several tests to assess the robustness of our results.  
 
4.1. Performance-based pay and fund performance 
We define performance-based pay as a reward structure that explicitly links manager 
compensation to fund investment performance. We hypothesize that such an arrangement can 
either induce managerial effort or attract skilled managers, or both. Either case, the empirical 
prediction is the same: a positive relation between performance-based compensation and future 
fund performance.  
 To test this prediction, we employ the following ordinary least squares (OLS) 
specification in our empirical analysis: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡.          (4) 
The dependent variable 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is the fund performance of fund i in year t, namely, four-
factor alpha for domestic equity funds, and six-factor alpha for the full sample. The main 
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independent variable of interest,  𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦, is an indicator variable that equals one if 
the portfolio manager receives performance-based compensation in year t-1, zero otherwise. The 
coefficient 𝛽 , therefore, captures the relation between performance-based pay and fund 
performance. We include a vector of family, advisor, manager, and fund characteristics to control 
for their effect on fund performance. Our control variables include family size, subadvisor 
dummy, controlling owner dummy, team management dummy, manager tenure, fund size, fund 
age, expense ratio, turnover ratio, fund flow, fund risk, performance advisory fee dummy, and 
Coles Incentive Rate. All the independent variables are measured as of the previous year-end, to 
address potential reverse causality concerns. We also control for fund investment objective fixed 
effects and year fixed effects in the regression.16  Standard errors are clustered at the family 
level.  
We report the estimation results in Table 3. In columns (1) to (4), we analyze domestic 
equity funds and measure their performance by gross and net four-factor alphas. In columns (5) 
to (8), we use the full sample and measure fund performance by gross and net six-factor alphas. 
Consistent with our prediction, we find that managers with performance-based pay significantly 
outperform those without such compensation scheme on a gross-of-fee basis. We find similar 
evidence when analyzing fund net performance, which suggests that the outperformance 
generated by managers on a pre-expense basis is passed on to fund investors, rather than 
extracted by fund advisors by charging higher fees.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
In the baseline analysis, we include only the variable of interest but no control variables. 
As shown in columns (1), (3), (5), and (7), the estimated coefficients on Performance Pay are all 
positive and significant at the 1% level. When we include the control variables and fund 
objective and year fixed effects in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8), the estimated coefficients on 
Performance Pay are 0.776, 0.798, 0.843, and 0.863, respectively, all significant at the 1% level. 
                                                        
16 For our analysis of the full sample, we include the following fund style fixed effects: (i) domestic equity, (ii) bond, 
(iii) global, (iv) balanced, (v) sector, and (vi) others. For the regressions over the diversified domestic equity fund 
sample, we obtain funds’ investment objectives from Morningstar and include the following objective fixed effects: 
(i) aggressive growth, (ii) growth, (iii) growth and income, (iv) equity-income, and (v) small company.  
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17 These results suggest that, for the equity fund sample, managers with performance-based pay 
outperform those without such compensation by 77.6 (79.8) basis points per annum as measured 
by gross (net) four-factor alpha. For the full sample, the outperformance is of similar magnitude, 
84.3 (86.3) basis points per annum on a pre-expense (post-expense) basis after adjusting for risk 
factors. These findings are economically significant, considering that the average annualized 
gross (net) four-factor alpha for the equity fund sample is 27.5 (-86.6) basis points and the 
average annualized gross (net) six-factor alphas for the full sample is 73.9 (-30.6) basis points. 
Furthermore, the dollar magnitude of the economic impact implied by the above-documented 
outperformance is remarkable given that trillions of dollars of assets in the mutual fund industry 
are managed by portfolio managers who receive performance-based pay.  
 
4.2. Other compensation structures and fund performance 
We next examine whether and how other compensation schemes, such as pay linked to 
fund AUM, pay linked to advisor profits, and fixed salary relate to fund performance. These tests 
on alternative compensation arrangements provide us with a “counterfactual” analysis on the 
relation between performance-based pay and fund performance. They also serve as a “horse 
race” test on the link between various compensation schemes and fund performance. 
In particular, we conduct the same regression analysis as in Eq. (4) except that we include 
four variables of interests simultaneously: Performance Pay, AUM Pay, Advisor-Profits Pay, and 
Fixed Salary. The base case is the funds whose portfolio manager’s compensation is variable, 
subjective, but does not depend on any specific stated factor. We also carry out F-tests to 
compare the differences among the coefficients of those four variables. We acknowledge that the 
different compensation schemes are not mutually exclusive and we do not observe the exact 
weight of each scheme. However, any noise in the classification of different compensation 
schemes will likely bias the results against our hypothesis. 
                                                        
17 Our results are stronger if we repeat the analysis of these four columns in Table 3 after removing any fund that 
uses performance-based pay in combination with alternative compensation structures. The coefficient estimates on 
Performance Pay become 1.288 (t-stat.=3.76), 1.328 (t-stat.=3.90), 0.966 (t-stat.=3.27), and 1.009 (t-stat.=3.42), 
respectively.  
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We present the estimation results in Table 4. Again, in columns (1) to (4), we include only 
diversified domestic equity funds and use gross and net four-factor alphas to measure fund 
performance. In columns (5) to (8), we analyze the full sample using gross and net six-factor 
alphas. We find that, unlike in the case of performance-based compensation, the use of AUM-
based, advisor-profit-based, or fixed compensation is not associated with significantly better 
fund performance. The coefficients on AUM Pay, Advisor-Profits Pay and Fixed Salary are all 
negative, mostly not significantly different from zero. In contrast, the coefficients on 
Performance Pay remain positive and significant at the 5% level or better in all eight 
specifications, with magnitudes similar to the figures reported in Table 3. In terms of economic 
significance, managers with performance-based pay subsequently outperform managers without 
such incentive by 69.0 (71.7) basis points per annum as measured by gross (net) four-factor 
alpha for the diversified domestic equity funds, and by 86.0 (88.5) basis points per annum as 
measured by gross (net) six-factor alpha for the full sample. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Additionally, we compare the coefficient of Performance Pay with the coefficient 
estimates of the other three compensation structures individually or jointly. As shown in the 
bottom of Table 4, the F-tests on the equality of coefficients are all significant at the 10% level or 
better. That is, by and large, we reject the null hypothesis that performance-based pay has the 
same impact on fund performance (gross or net) as the other three compensation schemes. In 
terms of economic significance, based on our estimates in columns (2) and (6), managers with 
performance-based pay outperform managers with AUM-based pay, advisor-profits-based pay, 
and fixed salary by 84.1 (121.9) , 113.0 (115.2) , and 250.0 (205.1) basis points per annum, 
respectively, as measured by gross four-factor alpha (gross six-factor alpha). These results 
further suggest that performance-based compensation is associated with better fund performance, 
and that this positive relation with performance is not shared by other compensation schemes. 
 
4.3. Evaluation period and fund performance 
According to SEC Rule S7-12-04, if portfolio manager compensation is linked to fund 
performance, the fund is required to “identify any benchmark used to measure performance and 
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state the length of the period over which performance is measured.” In this section, we focus on 
those funds with performance-based compensation and examine the effect of evaluation period 
on fund performance. 
As explained in the Introduction, short evaluation periods can damage fund performance, 
since they induce managers to engage in such activities as excessive risk taking and window 
dressing. Longer evaluation periods can mitigate these adverse incentives and help identify 
portfolio manager skills. However, too long an evaluation period can protect managers from 
dismissal in the short-run and induce self-serving behavior, such as shirking and herding. Hence, 
ex-ante, the net effect is unclear. It may be argued that the optimal horizon to evaluate 
managerial investment performance should match shareholders’ investment horizon. 18  It is 
therefore an empirical question whether and how the evaluation period impacts fund 
performance.  
 To estimate the impact of evaluation period on fund performance, we use the following 
regression model: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡.                     (5) 
The dependent variable 𝑌𝑖,𝑡  is the fund performance of fund 𝑖 in year  𝑡 . The main 
independent variable of interest, 𝐸𝑃, is the evaluation period over which investment performance 
is measured in the case of performance-based compensation. Since most funds report multiple 
evaluation windows, we use three measures of evaluation period: (i) Evaluation Period Mean, 
(ii) Evaluation Period Min, and (iii) Evaluation Period Max. The coefficient 𝛽 captures the 
impact of the evaluation period on fund performance. Again, we control for the same vector of 
family, advisor, manager, and fund characteristics as in Eq. (4). We also include fund investment 
objective and year fixed effects in the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the family 
level.  
Although the SEC rules mandate that funds should disclose the evaluation period and the 
performance benchmark when portfolio managers receive performance-based compensation, 
                                                        
18 There exists no direct evidence on the holding periods of mutual fund investors. The consensus is that the typical 
fund shareholder redeems shares infrequently. According to Sirri and Tufano (1998), the average holding period of 
equity mutual funds is approximately seven years. 
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only 10,583, or 85.6%, out of 12,365 fund-year observations with manager performance-based 
pay report the evaluation period; among those, only 8,319, or 78.6%, identify the benchmark 
used to measure performance together with the evaluation period. For example, a common 
benchmark for large-cap value equity funds is the Russell 1000 Value Index. In our main 
analysis, we focus the subsample of funds that fully comply with the SEC rule and disclose both 
evaluation period and performance benchmark.19  
We present the estimation results in Table 5. We analyze domestic equity funds using 
gross and net four-factor alphas in columns (1) to (6). We examine the full sample using gross 
and net six-factor alphas in columns (7) to (12). Our results suggest that portfolio managers with 
longer average evaluation period are associated with better performance. In columns (1), (4), (7), 
and (10), the coefficient estimates of Evaluation Period Mean are 0.235, 0.228, 0.298, and 0.284, 
respectively, all significant at the 5% level or better. In terms of economic significance, a one-
standard-deviation (i.e., 1.2 years) increase in the average evaluation period is associated with an 
improvement of 28.2 (27.4) basis points in annualized gross (net) four-factor alpha for the 
domestic equity fund sample, and 36.4 (34.6) basis points in annualized gross (net) six-factor 
alpha for the full sample. In addition, we find a positive and significant relation between 
maximum evaluation period and fund performance for both the equity fund sample and the full 
sample (see columns (3), (6), (9), and (12)). Lastly, we also find some evidence that minimum 
evaluation period is positively related to fund performance over the full sample. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
4.4. Robustness tests 
The results in Sections 4.1 to 4.3 together show that portfolio managers with 
performance-based bonuses exhibit superior subsequent fund performance, especially when 
advisors link pay to performance over a longer time period. In contrast, alternative compensation 
arrangements, such as fixed salary, AUM-based pay, or advisor-profits-based pay are not 
                                                        
19 For robustness check, we repeat our analysis of Table 5 using the 10,583 observations that report the evaluation 
period, regardless of whether a performance benchmark is disclosed or not. Our results are qualitatively similar, 
though overall much weaker (see Table A6 of the Internet Appendix).  
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associated with better performance. In this section, we discuss the results of several additional 
tests we perform to assess the robustness of these findings.   
First, we are concerned about a number of potential forms of endogeneity which may 
affect the interpretation of our main findings. One concern is that funds with certain types of 
assets (e.g., illiquid assets) or strategies (e.g., actively deviating from benchmarks) are more 
likely to call for performance-based contracts due to the difficulty of monitoring. In the 
meanwhile, these assets or strategies are associated with greater alphas when evaluated using 
conventional factor models. To address such a concern, we carry out two sets of tests. First, in 
Panel A of Table 6, we include the active share measure of Cremers and Petajisto (2009) as an 
additional control variable and find that our main inferences remain unchanged.20 Second, in 
Panel B of Table 6, we estimate a five-factor (seven-factor) alpha measure by adding the Pastor 
and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor to our four-factor (six-factor) model and repeat our 
analysis in Tables 3 and 4 using five-factor and seven-factor alphas as dependent variables. Our 
main results remain qualitatively similar after we control for funds’ illiquidity exposure in our 
analysis.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Another concern is that our results are driven by some fund families that use certain types 
of contracts (e.g., performance-based pay contracts) and, at the same time, exert a positive 
impact on fund performance. To alleviate this concern, we add family average performance in 
our baseline regressions to control for family influence on fund performance. Specifically, we 
construct and include the concurrent average alpha each year of all funds in a family excluding 
the fund itself in the regression. We find that our baseline results remain qualitatively similar 
after controlling for family impact on performance (see Panel C of Table 6).21  
                                                        
20 Because the active share measure is calculated using fund’s stock holdings, it is not available for all funds in the 
full sample. For our analysis in columns (5) to (8) of Panel A of Table 6 and columns (7) to (12) of Panel A of Table 
7, we only include funds in the diversified domestic equity, sector, and global equity fund categories.   
21 An alternative way to control for family impact is to include family fixed effects in the regression. The nature of 
the information disclosure required by the SEC limits us from observing much within-family variation. In addition, 
because our sample period is relatively short (2006-2011), time-series variation is rather low. After introducing 
family fixed effects, only within-family variation remains, which accounts for less 20% of total dispersion in 
compensation structures. Our main results remain qualitatively similar once family fixed effects are included 
(especially for the domestic equity fund sample), although the evidence becomes weaker as one would expect.  
26 
 
 
In Table 7, we carry out a set of robustness tests regarding our main findings on 
evaluation period in Table 5. Panel A of Table 7 shows that our results on evaluation period are 
robust if we control for the Cremers and Petajisto (2009) active share measure. In Panel B, we 
use five-factor and seven-factor alpha as our performance measures to control for funds liquidity 
exposure and find our inferences remain unchanged. In Panel C, we add family average 
performance to our regressions on evaluation period. Again, the results are qualitatively similar 
to the baseline results.   
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Furthermore, one potential concern regarding our evaluation period results is that 
advisors may link pay to performance over a longer window for portfolio managers with longer 
tenure in the fund. This behavior would introduce a survivorship bias insofar managers who 
survive longer are also more skilled. To address this concern, first and foremost, we control for 
manager tenure in all main regression specifications. Second, we perform two robustness tests. 
First, in Panel D of Table 7, we divide our sample funds into two subsamples based on median 
manager tenure (i.e., 56 months) and check whether there is any difference in the evaluation 
period between the two subsamples. We do not find any evidence that portfolio managers with 
longer tenure are associated with longer evaluation periods. Second, we repeat our main analysis 
in Table 5 with each of the subsamples and test for the coefficient difference between the two 
subsamples using an interaction term between the evaluation period and an indicator variable 
that equals one if a fund’s manager tenure is below the median value and zero otherwise. Panel E 
of Table 7 shows that the coefficient on the interaction term is not significantly different from 
zero in any of the 12 specifications. In summary, the evidence in Panels D and E suggests that 
our results on evaluation period are not driven by a survivorship bias in which managers with 
longer tenure are associated with both longer evaluation period and better performance. 
Finally, we carry out additional robustness tests regarding performance measures. Our 
results are not sensitive to the performance measures we use. In particular, we find similar 
evidence if we use daily return data to estimate in-sample four- and six-factor alphas, or if we 
use Morningstar-assigned benchmark index returns to calculate benchmark-adjusted alphas (see 
Tables A4 and A5 of the Internet Appendix, respectively).  
27 
 
 
 
5. Why is performance-based compensation associated with better fund performance? 
In this section, we explore through which channel or channels performance-based pay 
may be associated with better fund performance. In particular, we study several explanations 
proposed in the literature on portfolio delegation based on agency theory, information 
asymmetry, and risk-shifting incentives. 22 
 
5.1. Agency theory and asymmetric information 
 Building on the classic agency conflict setting of Holmstrom (1979), several recent 
theory papers on portfolio management compensation (e.g., Li and Tiwari, 2009; Basak and 
Pavlova, 2013; Buffa, Vayanos, and Woolley, 2014) show that explicitly linking the portfolio 
manager’s compensation to the fund’s relative performance aligns the incentives of managers 
and fund shareholders, decreases managerial shirking and private benefits, and, ultimately, 
improves fund performance. Thus, these models offer an explanation consistent with the 
outperformance of funds that use performance based contracts.23 An alternative explanation may 
come from asymmetric information models. Advisors could screen out better managers by 
including performance-based bonuses in the menu of possible contracts (e.g., Heinkel and 
Soughton, 1994). It is also possible that skilled portfolio managers may negotiate performance-
based contracts to signal their ability (e.g., Das and Sundaram, 2002). 24 
Theoretically, therefore, the positive relation between performance-based pay and fund 
performance could be driven by the effort incentives induced by these contracts or the superior 
skill of managers who accept/negotiate them, or by a combination of both. It is clearly 
                                                        
22 In general, the literature has focused on modeling the advisory fee contract between fund investors and fund 
advisors. Probably due to the absence of empirical evidence on its characteristics, the contract between the advisory 
firm and portfolio manager that we study in this paper was often assumed to replicate the features of the advisory 
contract. Hence, the guidance that we obtain from many of these models, especially those based on asymmetric 
information, has to be interpreted with caution.  
23 The mostly descriptive nature of our data does not allow us to test more specific predictions of these models 
associated, for instance, with the contract’s performance sensitivity (i.e., delta). See Koijen (2014) for a structural 
model that links fund performance to the manager’s risk preferences, the advisor’s management fee (as a percentage 
of fund TNA), and the fund-flow sensitivity. 
24 We note that Das and Sundaram (2002) develop a model on the tradeoff between the signaling and risk-sharing 
properties of symmetric (i.e., fulcrum) vs. asymmetric (i.e., convex) advisory fee contracts, which is less applicable 
in the context of contracting between the advisor and individual portfolio managers. 
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challenging to disentangle these explanations. Also, since the manager-advisor match is not 
random, any inference on causality is rather limited without exogenous shocks or valid 
instrumental variables. Given these limitations, we use the following empirical strategy to study 
the channels through which performance-based pay relates to superior performance. We include 
education-related proxies in the regressions to control for portfolio managers’ ability and study 
how the results change compared to our baseline specification. The basic premise of this analysis 
is the following: provided that education is a valid proxy for managerial ability (either innate or 
due to better education), if performance-based pay is still associated with superior fund 
performance after controlling for managers’ education, it would suggest that our results are not 
entirely driven by the screening or signaling nature of performance-based contracts but also by 
effort induction.  
To perform such an analysis, we include two manager education variables in our 
regressions: (i) average SAT score of manager’s undergraduate institution and (ii) a dummy for 
top MBA degrees (i.e., from schools with average GMAT score>700). Similar to Chevalier and 
Ellison (1999), we use these two variables to proxy for managerial ability, even though we 
acknowledge that they are, by no means, perfect proxies. For completeness, we also include 
manager industry experience (i.e., the number of years the manager has worked in the mutual 
fund industry) as an additional control variable in the regression. The sample for this analysis is 
slightly smaller compared to the sample in Tables 3 to 5 due to the data availability on managers’ 
education backgrounds. 
Table 8 presents the results on performance-based pay in Panel A and evaluation period in 
Panel B, after controlling for manager education variables. First, for the diversified domestic 
equity fund sample, we do not find evidence that managers from higher-SAT undergraduate 
institutions have superior performance as shown in columns (1) to (4) of Panel A. In contrast, we 
find some evidence that portfolio managers with top MBA degrees are associated with better 
performance.25 Second, when we carry out the same analysis over the full sample, consistent 
with Chevalier and Ellison (1999), the coefficient on SAT is positive and significant at the 5% 
                                                        
25 When we replace the top MBA dummy in column (4) of Panel A in Table 8 with an MBA dummy as in Chevalier 
and Ellison (1999), the coefficient of the MBA dummy is 0.339, with a t-stat. of 1.32.  
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level (see columns (5) to (8) of Panel A). In addition, the coefficient on Top MBA is positive and 
significant at the 10% level in three out of the four specifications of the full sample. Lastly, the 
coefficient on manager industry experience is always negative, significant at the 10% level in 
four out of eight specifications in Panel A. Thus, we find some evidence that later entrees in the 
fund industry tend to have better performance, probably due to career concerns (e.g., Chevalier 
and Ellison, 1999; Li, Zhang, and Zhao, 2011). 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
More relevant for our analysis, we find that the positive relation between performance-
based pay and fund performance remains unchanged for both diversified domestic equity funds 
and the full sample. In particular, across all eight specifications in Panel A, the coefficients on 
performance-based pay remain positive and significant at the 5% level or better, with similar 
magnitudes compared to Tables 3 and 4. We also repeat our main analysis on evaluation period 
by adding manager education variables in the regressions and report the results in Panel B of 
Table 8. Again, our baseline evidence on evaluation period remains largely unaffected. In other 
words, after controlling for manager education proxies, the positive relation between evaluation 
period and fund performance remains significant for both the domestic equity fund sample and 
the full sample.  
Next, to further disentangle the incentives vs. selection explanations, we carry out an 
additional test on the prediction from the asymmetric information model of Heinkel and 
Stoughton (1997). In particular, they show that managerial tournaments (through hiring and 
firing managers) makes performance based contracts optimal only for longer tenured managers. 
To test this prediction, we relate compensation structures of portfolio managers to manager 
tenure and various other family, fund, and manager level variables by estimating a linear 
probability model. We find no empirical support for this prediction. Our evidence shows that the 
use of performance-based contracts is not significantly related to a portfolio manager’s tenure 
(see Table A7 of the Internet Appendix). 
In summary, although we cannot present any direct evidence that performance-based 
contracts induce higher effort from portfolio managers, we show that our results are robust to 
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controlling for education and industry experience of portfolio managers. Our data fails to support 
the predictions from alternative models of information asymmetry.  
 
5.2. Risk-shifting incentives 
Compensation contract design could also affect fund risk taking. Building on the original 
insight on adverse-risk incentives of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Grinblatt and Titman (1989) 
show that portfolio managers may “game” convex, performance-based contracts by taking on 
more idiosyncratic risk to increase their payoffs at the expense of shareholders. More recently, 
Carpenter (2000), Ross (2004), and Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007), among others, have 
challenged theoretically the link between convex compensation contracts for fund managers and 
value-destroying risk-shifting incentives. The manager’s risk aversion and his or her inability to 
perfectly hedge the compensation payoffs make the result uncertain: contrary to the original 
intuition, a manager compensated with convex, performance-based contracts may become even 
more risk-averse and engage in less risk shifting. In the context of this inconclusive theoretical 
debate, we examine empirically how various compensation structures affect fund risk-shifting 
behavior. Furthermore, we also examine how fund risk-shifting relates to the length of evaluation 
period for managers receiving performance-based pay. Given that risk-shifting is detrimental to 
fund performance (Huang, Sialm, and Zhang, 2011), this could be another venue through which 
performance-based contracts relate to superior fund performance.  
In particular, we examine portfolio managers’ intra-year risk-shifting behavior by 
analyzing stock holdings of diversified domestic equity funds. Following Kempf, Ruenzi, and 
Thiele (2009), we construct funds’ risk shift ratio as in Eq. (3), which allows us to capture 
managers’ intended rather than realized changes in portfolio risk.26 Since this measure requires 
the availability of fund portfolio holdings, we restrict our analysis to the subsample of diversified 
domestic equity funds. We estimate the following OLS specification: 
                                                        
26 Note that we do not use realized changes in risk based on fund returns to measure funds’ risk shifting behavior 
since this measure can be affected by changes in the risk of portfolio stocks in and it does not capture intended 
changes in fund risk (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele, 2009; Huang, Sialm, and Zhang, 
2011). We obtain similar results if we use the difference between the intended and realized portfolio risk instead of 
their ratio (see Table A8 of the Internet Appendix).  
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𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡,            (6) 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑖,𝑡  is the risk shift ratio of fund i in year t. In each specification, 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1  refers to fixed salary, performance-based pay, AUM-based pay, advisor-
profits-based pay, or evaluation period. We include a vector of lagged family, advisor, manager, 
and fund characteristics as control variables. We also control for fund investment objective and 
year fixed effects in the regression and cluster the standard errors at the family level.  
We present the estimation results in Table 9. First, we find that the coefficients on 
performance-based pay in columns (1) and (2) are both negative and significant at the 5% level, 
which suggests that managers with performance-based pay engage less in risk-shifting activities 
compared managers without such incentive. In terms of economic magnitude, a change from 
zero to one for performance-based pay is associated with a 0.26 standard deviation reduction in 
funds’ risk shift ratio based on the results in column (2). As shown in the bottom of Table 9, the 
F-tests further show that managers with performance-based pay also engage less in risk-shifting 
behavior compared to those with AUM-based pay or advisor-profits-based pay. Second, the 
coefficient on fixed salary in column (2) is negative but insignificant at the conventional level. 
Third, the results in column (3) show that managers with longer average evaluation periods are 
associated with lower risk shift ratio, which suggests that longer evaluation windows can reduce 
managers’ incentive to engage in intra-year risk-shifting activities. Finally, we find that it is the 
maximum evaluation period that drives the relation between average evaluation period and the 
risk shift ratio. Overall, we find that managers with performance-based contracts and longer 
evaluation periods are associated with less risk shifting.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
5.3. Discussion 
Taken together, our evidence in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 suggests that higher effort induction 
and lower risk shifting are two potential reasons for the positive relation between performance-
based contracts and fund performance. Our results beg the question of why, in equilibrium, we 
observe performance differences across contracts. Obviously, in a complete contract setting 
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where all contingencies are contractible we should observe no difference: fund advisors would 
optimally choose the contract that best tackles the underlying conflicts with portfolio managers. 
If an advisor does not use performance-based compensation, then either agency costs and/or 
adverse risk-taking incentives are not present or the advisor has alternative mechanisms to 
control them.  
There are reasons to believe such a complete contracting world is not realistic. On the one 
side, theory predicts that performance-based compensation may be optimal. On the other side, 
there is little discussion (if any) about the conditions that guarantee the existence of such a 
contract. It seems reasonable to believe that in reality not all advisors necessarily enjoy a full 
menu of contracts (including performance-based contracts) that yield a second-best level of fund 
performance in the presence of moral hazard and/or risk-shifting incentives. The theoretical 
interaction between effort and risk-shifting incentives is complex and the practical 
implementation of the optimal contract is far from immediate (see, e.g., Dybvig, Farnsworth, and 
Carpenter, 2010). For instance, the existence of certain fixed costs associated to adopting 
performance-based contracts may prevent smaller advisors or fund families from using them.27 
Simultaneously, alternative mechanisms to performance-based contracts (like better fund 
governance, for instance) may not be perfect substitutes, thus failing to yield the second-best 
effort incentives and, ultimately, level of performance for these funds.  
  
6. Concluding Remarks 
We use a hand-collected data set of over 3,400 funds to study the compensation structures 
of individual portfolio managers in the U.S. mutual fund industry. Given that the decisions of 
individual portfolio managers affect the performance of trillions of dollars of assets invested in 
the mutual fund industry, it is of first order importance to better understand these compensation 
contracts and their impact on fund performance.  
Unlike the advisory contract, which is mostly based on fund AUM, the majority of 
compensation contracts for individual portfolio managers include a bonus directly linked to 
                                                        
27 Cadenillas, Cvitanic, and Zapatero (2012) show that stock options may be suboptimal for the compensation of 
executives in smaller firms. Incidentally, we find that smaller investment advisors or fund families are significantly 
less likely to use performance-based contracts than their larger counterparts (see Table A7 of the Internet Appendix).  
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investment performance. Much of the literature assumes that the compensation structure of 
investment advisors and individual portfolio managers coincides. Our evidence clearly suggests 
otherwise. In contrast to tight regulation of advisory contracts, the SEC places no specific 
restriction on the compensation contracts of individual portfolio managers. We show that, in an 
unregulated setting, asymmetric, option-like performance-based incentives are the dominant 
form of compensation for individual portfolio managers. Our empirical evidence provides 
guidance for theoretical models on portfolio delegation in the asset management industry.  
Our analysis further shows that managers with performance-based, bonus-type pay 
exhibit superior future fund performance (both gross and net of fees), especially when advisors 
link pay to performance over longer time periods. In contrast, we do not find similar results for 
alternative compensation arrangements, such as fixed salary, AUM-based pay, or advisor-profits-
based pay. Lastly, the positive relation between performance-based contracts and fund 
performance are likely driven by better effort induction and lower risk-shifting incentives. 
Altogether, we document that the compensation contract between portfolio managers and 
advisors plays a critical role in mutual fund incentive alignment and affects fund performance 
and risk taking. Our study also suggests that SEC-mandated disclosure on portfolio manager 
compensation can help investors in assessing managerial incentives and predicting future fund 
performance. 
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Table 1  
Summary statistics of portfolio manager compensation structures 
 
This table reports the distribution of compensation structures (Panel A), further breakdown of non-fixed salary 
(Panel B), summary statistics of evaluation periods (Panel C), and correlation coefficient matrix of the main 
variables of portfolio manager compensation structures (Panel D). The sample consists of diversified domestic 
equity funds, sector funds, bond funds, balanced funds, and global funds, with 15,605 fund-year observations over 
the period 2006-2011. The variable Fixed Salary is an indicator variable that equals one if the portfolio manager 
receives a fixed amount of compensation from the advisor, zero otherwise. Performance Pay is a dummy variable 
that is set to one if the bonus is tied to the investment performance of the fund, zero otherwise; AUM Pay is an 
indicator variable that equals one if portfolio manager compensation is tied to the fund’s assets under management, 
zero otherwise; Advisor-Profits Pay is a dummy variable that is set to one if the portfolio manager’s compensation 
depends on the advisor’s profits, zero otherwise; Evaluation Period Mean is the average number of years over which 
investment performance is measured for performance-based pay; most funds report multiple evaluation windows, 
Evaluation Period Min is the shortest evaluation window, Evaluation Period Max is the longest evaluation window, 
and Evaluation Period Median is the median evaluation window if there are three or more evaluation periods 
disclosed. For funds that have multiple reported evaluation windows, we calculate Evaluation Period Mean as the 
mean of Evaluation Period Min and Evaluation Period Max. P-values are in brackets in Panel D. 
 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics of compensation structures 
  # of Obs. % of Sample 
Total  15,605 100% 
Fixed Salary 212 1.4% 
Non-fixed Salary 15,393 98.6% 
    Performance Pay 12,365 79.2% 
    AUM Pay 2,956 18.9% 
    Advisor-Profits Pay 7,605 48.7% 
 
 
 
Panel B: Further breakdown of non-fixed salary 
Performance 
Pay 
AUM 
Pay 
Advisor-
Profits Pay # of Obs. 
% of Non-fixed 
Salary Obs. 
1 0 0 5,733 37.2% 
1 1 0 1,206 7.8% 
1 0 1 3,860 25.1% 
1 1 1 1,566 10.2% 
0 1 0 133 0.9% 
0 0 1 2,128 13.8% 
0 1 1 51 0.3% 
0 0 0 716 4.7% 
Total Non-fixed Salary 15,393 100% 
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Panel C: Summary statistics of evaluation period 
Variables (years) Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Evaluation Period Mean  10,583 3.07 3 1.22 0.25 7.5 
Evaluation Period Min 10,583 1.68 1 1.34 0.25 5 
Evaluation Period Max 10,583 4.45 5 1.97 0.25 10 
Evaluation Period Median 5,043 3.24 3 0.79 1 5 
 
 
 
Panel D: Correlation matrix 
  
Fixed 
Salary  
Performance 
Pay 
AUM 
Pay 
Advisor-
Profits Pay 
Evaluation 
Period Mean 
Fixed Salary  1.00 
    
      Performance Pay -0.23 1.00 
   
 
[0.00] 
    AUM Pay -0.06 0.17 1.00 
  
 
[0.00] [0.00] 
   Advisor-Profits Pay -0.11 -0.19 0.06 1.00 
 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
  Evaluation Period Mean . 0.04 -0.13 -0.32 1.00 
  . [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics of family, advisor, portfolio manager, and fund characteristics 
 
This table reports the summary statistics of the family, advisor, portfolio manager, and fund characteristics. The 
variable Family Size is the sum of total net assets of all the funds in the fund family; Subadviser is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the investment advisor is not affiliated with the mutual fund family (i.e., the fund is outsourced to 
an independent investment firm to manage its assets), zero otherwise; Owner is an indicator variable that equals one 
if the portfolio manager is the founder, controlling owner, partner, or blockholder of the investment advisor, zero 
otherwise; Team Mgmt. is a dummy variable that equals one if a fund is managed by multiple managers, zero 
otherwise; Manager Tenure measures the number of months that a manager(s) has been at the helm of a mutual 
fund. SAT is the average composite SAT score at the manager’s undergraduate institution divided by 100; Top MBA 
is an indicator variable that equals one if the portfolio manager holds an MBA degree from a top business school 
(i.e., average GMAT score>700); Manager Experience is calculated as the number of years between the sample year 
and the year when a manager first appears in the Morningstar database. Net Four-Factor Alpha is estimated using 
monthly fund net returns with Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Net Six-Factor Alpha is estimated using monthly 
fund net returns with a six-factor model that augments the Carhart (1997) four-factor model with a bond factor 
(Barclays U.S. Aggregate Bond Index) and an international factor (MSCI World Ex U.S. Index). Net Five-Factor 
(Seven-Factor) Alpha is estimated using monthly fund net returns with a five-factor (seven-factor) model that adds 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor to the four-factor (six-factor) model. For each of these alpha measures, 
we first estimate the factor loadings using the preceding 24 monthly net-of-fee returns as in Eq. (1). We then 
calculate monthly out-of-sample alpha as the difference between a fund’s net-of-fee return in a given month and the 
sum of the product of the estimated factor loadings and the factor returns during that month as in Eq. (2). We 
calculate the average of the monthly alphas within a year and multiply it by 12 to annualize the alpha measure. 
Following the same procedure, we use monthly fund gross-of-fee returns (adding 1/12th of the annual expense ratio 
to monthly net returns) to estimate the gross alpha measures (i.e., Gross Four-, Five-, Six-, and Seven-Factor Alpha). 
Total Risk is the standard deviation of monthly net-of-fee returns of a fund in a calendar year; Risk Shift Ratio 
captures funds’ intra-year risk-shifting behavior, calculated using data on fund portfolio holdings as in Eq. (3); Fund 
Size is the sum of assets under management across all share classes of the fund; Fund Age is the age of the oldest 
share class in the fund; Expense is determined by dividing the fund’s annual operating expenses by the average 
dollar value of its assets under management; Turnover is defined as the minimum of sales or purchases divided by 
the total net assets of the fund; Net Flows is the annual average of monthly net growth in fund assets beyond 
reinvested dividends (Sirri and Tufano, 1998); Performance Adv. Fee is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
fund employs a fulcrum advisory fee, which rewards and penalizes the advisor for the fund’s investment 
performance, zero otherwise; Coles Incentive Rate is defined as the difference between the last and first marginal 
advisory fee rates divided by the effective marginal advisory fee rate. Active Share captures the percentage of a 
manager’s portfolio that differs from the benchmark index. It is calculated by aggregating the absolute differences 
between the weight of a portfolio’s actual holdings and the weight of its closest matching index (Cremers and 
Petajisto, 2009). All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
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Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. 1st 99th Obs. 
Family, advisor, and manager characteristics       
Family Size (billions) 136.9 37.2 265.3 0.04 1,018.7 15,605 
Subadviser (dummy)  0.185 0 0.388 0 1 15,605 
Owner (dummy) 0.179 0 0.383 0 1 15,605 
Team Mgmt. (dummy) 0.651 1 0.477 0 1 15,605 
Manager Tenure (months) 69.5 56.0 51.3 3.0 244.5 15,605 
SAT (divided by 100) 13.06 13.00 1.09 10.30 15.00 12,213 
Top MBA (dummy) 0.308 0 0.380 0 1 12,213 
Manager Experience (years) 10.4 9.7 5.7 0.5 27.0 12,213 
       
Fund characteristics       
Net Four-Factor Alpha (in % per year) -0.866 -0.840 6.453 -19.147 16.588 5,826 
Net Five-Factor Alpha (in % per year) -1.162 -0.990 5.877 -17.955 13.217 5,826 
Net Six-Factor Alpha (in % per year) -0.306 -0.351 7.392 -24.245 24.291 15,549 
Net Seven-Factor Alpha (in % per year) -0.627 -0.652 6.899 -22.994 20.209 15,549 
Gross Four-Factor Alpha (in % per year) 0.275 0.258 6.453 -17.821 17.977 5,826 
Gross Five-Factor Alpha (in % per year) -0.020 0.110 5.874 -16.866 14.717 5,826 
Gross Six-Factor Alpha (in % per year) 0.739 0.571 7.399 -22.938 25.474 15,549 
Gross Seven-Factor Alpha (in % per year) 0.420 0.278 6.921 -21.831 21.682 15,549 
Total Risk (in % per month) 4.12 3.80 2.63 0.22 11.38 15,561 
Risk Shift Ratio  1.03 1.02 0.12 0.78 1.54 5,510 
Fund Size (millions) 1,558.1 299.3 6,153.8 17.3 23,514.6 15,605 
Fund Age (months) 188.0 168.0 125.2 26.0 749.0 15,605 
Expense (%) 1.16 1.16 0.44 0.10 2.28 15,605 
Turnover (%) 89.76 56.00 113.32 2.00 704.00 15,605 
Net Flows (%) 0.94 -0.17 4.88 -5.66 28.08 15,595 
Performance Adv. Fee (dummy)  0.046 0 0.210 0.000 1 15,605 
Coles Incentive Rate -0.117 0.000 0.193 -1.000 0.000 15,599 
Active Share (%) 85.5 91.0 14.7 39.6 100.0 8,506 
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Table 3 
Performance-based pay and fund performance 
 
This table reports regression results of fund performance on performance-based compensation and other control variables. We use diversified domestic equity 
funds in columns (1) to (4) and the full sample in columns (5) to (8). The full sample consists of diversified domestic equity funds, sector funds, bond funds, 
balanced funds, and global funds. Performance Pay is a dummy variable that is set to one if the manager’s bonus is tied to the investment performance of the 
fund, zero otherwise. Fund performance is measured by Gross Four-Factor Alpha in columns (1) to (2), Net Four-Factor Alpha in columns (3) to (4), Gross Six-
Factor Alpha in columns (5) to (6), and Net Six-Factor Alpha in columns (7) to (8). All dependent and independent variables are defined as in Tables 1 and 2. 
Standard errors are clustered at the family level and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Gross Four-Factor Alphat Net Four-Factor Alphat Gross Six-Factor Alphat Net Six-Factor Alphat 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Performance Payt-1 0.809*** 0.776*** 0.882*** 0.798*** 0.746*** 0.843*** 0.822*** 0.863*** 
 
(3.37) (2.98) (3.63) (3.04) (4.05) (3.92) (4.52) (4.02) 
Log Family Size t-1  0.041  0.048  0.033  0.042 
 
 (0.82)  (0.97)  (0.96)  (1.22) 
Subadviser t-1  -0.096  -0.076  -0.394**  -0.371** 
 
 (-0.57)  (-0.45)  (-2.31)  (-2.19) 
Owner t-1  0.069  0.027  0.434**  0.405* 
 
 (0.29)  (0.11)  (1.99)  (1.86) 
Team Mgmt. t-1  -0.241  -0.227  -0.273**  -0.264** 
 
 (-1.13)  (-1.07)  (-2.06)  (-2.05) 
Log Manager Tenure t-1  0.089  0.075  0.076  0.069 
 
 (0.76)  (0.64)  (1.15)  (1.07) 
Log Fund Size t-1  -0.114  -0.097  0.025  0.038 
 
 (-1.55)  (-1.31)  (0.56)  (0.88) 
Log Fund Age t-1  0.289**  0.290**  -0.049  -0.041 
 
 (2.37)  (2.37)  (-0.54)  (-0.47) 
Expenset-1  0.484*  -0.284  1.340***  0.551*** 
 
 (1.91)  (-1.10)  (7.76)  (3.30) 
Log Turnover t-1  -0.221*  -0.222*  -0.097  -0.102 
 
 (-1.85)  (-1.86)  (-1.30)  (-1.39) 
Total Risk t-1  0.100  0.086  -0.032  -0.041 
  (0.80)  (0.69)  (-0.46)  (-0.59) 
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Net Flows t-1  0.052**  0.053**  -0.006  -0.004 
  (2.30)  (2.35)  (-0.35)  (-0.26) 
Performance Adv. Fee t-1  -0.268  -0.303  -0.244  -0.268 
 
 (-0.50)  (-0.58)  (-0.85)  (-0.93) 
Coles Incentive Rate t-1  0.008  0.053  0.309  0.369 
 
 (0.02)  (0.12)  (0.94)  (1.14) 
Constant -0.335 0.196 -1.532*** -0.082 0.149 -3.257*** -0.957*** -3.547*** 
 
(-1.58) (0.18) (-7.26) (-0.07) (0.95) (-4.52) (-6.32) (-4.98) 
Objective & Year FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
# of Obs. 5,826 5,811 5,826 5,811 15,549 15,478 15,549 15,478 
Adj. R
2
 0.003 0.093 0.003 0.093 0.002 0.093 0.002 0.090 
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Table 4 
Portfolio manager compensation structures and fund performance 
 
This table reports regression results of fund performance on various compensation structures including performance-based, AUM-based, advisor-profits-based, 
and fixed salary. We use diversified domestic equity funds in columns (1) to (4) and the full sample in columns (5) to (8). The full sample consists of diversified 
domestic equity funds, sector funds, bond funds, balanced funds, and global funds. Fund performance is measured by Gross Four-Factor Alpha in columns (1) to 
(2), Net Four-Factor Alpha in columns (3) to (4), Gross Six-Factor Alpha in columns (5) to (6), and Net Six-Factor Alpha in columns (7) to (8). All dependent 
and independent variables are defined as in Tables 1 and 2. Standard errors are clustered at the family level and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. We also 
perform F-tests to compare the coefficients of different compensation structures and report the F-test p-values at the bottom of the table. The superscripts ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Gross Four-Factor Alphat Net Four-Factor Alphat Gross Six-Factor Alphat Net Six-Factor Alphat 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Performance Payt-1 0.576** 0.690** 0.632*** 0.717*** 0.677*** 0.860*** 0.751*** 0.885*** 
 
(2.40) (2.56) (2.60) (2.63) (3.25) (3.54) (3.67) (3.64) 
AUM Payt-1 -0.116 -0.151 -0.197 -0.173 -0.273 -0.359* -0.395** -0.383** 
 
(-0.44) (-0.51) (-0.72) (-0.58) (-1.44) (-1.95) (-2.18) (-2.11) 
Advisor-Profits Pay t-1 -0.414* -0.440* -0.471** -0.420 -0.152 -0.292* -0.190 -0.277* 
 
(-1.89) (-1.71) (-2.07) (-1.62) (-0.95) (-1.94) (-1.19) (-1.87) 
Fixed Salary t-1 -2.181 -1.810 -2.456* -1.860 -1.202 -1.191* -1.409* -1.225* 
 
(-1.62) (-1.36) (-1.83) (-1.40) (-1.64) (-1.71) (-1.93) (-1.75) 
Log Family Size t-1  0.014  0.020  0.004  0.012 
 
 (0.26)  (0.39)  (0.13)  (0.37) 
Subadviser t-1  -0.058  -0.041  -0.346**  -0.324** 
 
 (-0.34)  (-0.24)  (-2.10)  (-1.99) 
Owner t-1  0.184  0.137  0.537**  0.504** 
 
 (0.67)  (0.49)  (2.31)  (2.18) 
Team Mgmt. t-1  -0.205  -0.191  -0.264**  -0.254** 
 
 (-0.98)  (-0.91)  (-2.06)  (-2.04) 
Log Manager Tenure t-1  0.099  0.085  0.075  0.068 
 
 (0.85)  (0.72)  (1.13)  (1.04) 
Log Fund Size t-1  -0.122*  -0.106  0.025  0.039 
 
 (-1.69)  (-1.45)  (0.59)  (0.91) 
Log Fund Age t-1  0.294**  0.294**  -0.051  -0.044 
 
 (2.47)  (2.47)  (-0.57)  (-0.50) 
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Expenset-1  0.492*  -0.276  1.364***  0.576*** 
 
 (1.95)  (-1.07)  (7.93)  (3.46) 
Log Turnover t-1  -0.195*  -0.196*  -0.093  -0.097 
 
 (-1.73)  (-1.73)  (-1.25)  (-1.33) 
Total Risk t-1  0.091  0.078  -0.038  -0.047 
  (0.72)  (0.62)  (-0.54)  (-0.67) 
Net Flows t-1  0.051**  0.052**  -0.008  -0.006 
  (2.29)  (2.34)  (-0.45)  (-0.37) 
Performance Adv. Fee t-1  -0.287  -0.319  -0.252  -0.274 
 
 (-0.54)  (-0.62)  (-0.90)  (-0.98) 
Coles Incentive Rate t-1  -0.146  -0.108  0.290  0.349 
 
 (-0.30)  (-0.22)  (0.90)  (1.09) 
Constant 0.116 0.630 -1.016*** 0.351 0.345* -2.812*** -0.715*** -3.101*** 
 
(0.44) (0.55) (-3.79) (0.30) (1.67) (-3.94) (-3.43) (-4.37) 
Objective & Year FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
# of Obs. 5,826 5,811 5,826 5,811 15,549 15,478 15,549 15,478 
Adj. R
2
 0.004 0.094 0.006 0.093 0.002 0.093 0.003 0.091 
F-tests   
Perf.= AUM 0.069 0.069 0.034 0.057 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Perf. = Profit 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Perf. = Fix 0.041 0.071 0.022 0.063 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.003 
Perf.=AUM=Profit 0.004 0.016 0.001 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Perf.=AUM=Profit=Fix 0.003 0.024 0.001 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 5 
Evaluation period and fund performance 
 
This table reports the regression estimates of fund performance on evaluation period for the funds that report evaluation period and state clearly an evaluation benchmark. We 
use diversified domestic equity funds in columns (1) to (6) and the full sample in columns (7) to (12). The full sample consists of diversified domestic equity funds, sector 
funds, bond funds, balanced funds, and global funds. Fund performance is measured by Gross Four-Factor Alpha in columns (1) to (3), Net Four-Factor Alpha in columns (4) 
to (6), Gross Six-Factor Alpha in columns (7) to (9), and Net Six-Factor Alpha in columns (10) to (12). All dependent and independent variables are defined as in Tables 1 and 
2. Standard errors are clustered at the family level and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Gross Four-Factor Alphat Net Four-Factor Alphat Gross Six-Factor Alphat Net Six-Factor Alphat 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Evaluation Period Meant-1 0.235**   0.228**   0.298***   0.284**   
 
(2.08)   (2.01)   (2.68)   (2.55)   
Evaluation Period Mint-1  -0.114   -0.118   0.180**   0.171*  
 
 (-0.94)   (-0.97)   (2.02)   (1.97)  
Evaluation Period Maxt-1   0.187***   0.184***   0.105*   0.100* 
 
  (3.34)   (3.24)   (1.91)   (1.83) 
Log Family Size t-1 0.115 0.179** 0.119* 0.120* 0.184** 0.124* -0.057 -0.029 -0.002 -0.051 -0.025 0.001 
 
(1.61) (2.43) (1.78) (1.70) (2.52) (1.85) (-0.94) (-0.47) (-0.04) (-0.84) (-0.40) (0.02) 
Subadviser t-1 0.166 0.108 0.129 0.142 0.084 0.106 0.100 0.158 0.056 0.090 0.145 0.048 
 
(0.78) (0.50) (0.63) (0.66) (0.38) (0.51) (0.50) (0.72) (0.26) (0.45) (0.66) (0.23) 
Owner t-1 -0.317 -0.348 -0.241 -0.370 -0.398 -0.294 -0.149 -0.295 -0.161 -0.207 -0.345 -0.218 
 
(-0.86) (-1.02) (-0.66) (-0.99) (-1.16) (-0.79) (-0.58) (-1.08) (-0.58) (-0.81) (-1.27) (-0.80) 
Team Mgmt. t-1 0.324 0.101 0.308 0.329 0.109 0.316 -0.167 -0.228 -0.249 -0.160 -0.218 -0.238 
 
(0.99) (0.31) (1.03) (1.01) (0.33) (1.05) (-0.89) (-1.31) (-1.34) (-0.88) (-1.30) (-1.32) 
Log Manager Tenure t-1 0.194 0.200 0.169 0.192 0.197 0.167 0.111 0.129 0.095 0.107 0.124 0.092 
 
(1.32) (1.49) (1.19) (1.32) (1.48) (1.18) (1.29) (1.48) (1.08) (1.26) (1.45) (1.06) 
Log Fund Size t-1 -0.127* -0.121 -0.122 -0.109 -0.102 -0.104 0.006 0.034 0.010 0.021 0.048 0.026 
 
(-1.77) (-1.64) (-1.63) (-1.50) (-1.37) (-1.37) (0.13) (0.74) (0.24) (0.51) (1.06) (0.60) 
Log Fund Age t-1 0.274 0.288* 0.257 0.281* 0.295* 0.264 -0.077 -0.084 -0.064 -0.065 -0.072 -0.053 
 
(1.65) (1.74) (1.57) (1.69) (1.78) (1.62) (-0.62) (-0.68) (-0.51) (-0.54) (-0.59) (-0.43) 
Expenset-1 0.299 0.315 0.361 -0.424 -0.406 -0.363 1.208*** 1.130*** 1.195*** 0.449** 0.375* 0.437* 
 
(0.88) (0.88) (1.05) (-1.23) (-1.11) (-1.04) (5.12) (5.17) (4.91) (1.98) (1.77) (1.86) 
Log Turnover t-1 -0.103 -0.118 -0.059 -0.101 -0.115 -0.058 -0.090 -0.116 -0.085 -0.100 -0.124 -0.095 
 
(-0.63) (-0.71) (-0.36) (-0.62) (-0.69) (-0.35) (-0.84) (-1.04) (-0.76) (-0.94) (-1.12) (-0.85) 
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Total Risk t-1 0.449*** 0.438*** 0.451*** 0.425*** 0.415*** 0.427*** 0.072 0.071 0.075 0.059 0.058 0.063 
 (3.30) (3.17) (3.30) (3.12) (2.99) (3.12) (0.76) (0.74) (0.79) (0.63) (0.61) (0.66) 
Net Flows t-1 0.082** 0.083** 0.080** 0.082** 0.084** 0.080** 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.004 
 (2.24) (2.25) (2.18) (2.25) (2.26) (2.19) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18) 
Performance Adv. Fee t-1 -0.119 0.153 0.122 -0.160 0.115 0.076 -0.039 -0.215 0.099 -0.044 -0.211 0.087 
 
(-0.25) (0.27) (0.28) (-0.34) (0.21) (0.17) (-0.17) (-0.83) (0.43) (-0.20) (-0.82) (0.38) 
Coles Incentive Rate t-1 0.284 0.573 0.343 0.332 0.620 0.388 -0.419 -0.377 -0.187 -0.362 -0.322 -0.141 
 
(0.60) (1.17) (0.78) (0.70) (1.27) (0.89) (-1.09) (-0.86) (-0.48) (-0.96) (-0.75) (-0.38) 
Constant -3.029** -2.681** -3.307** -3.354** -3.019** -3.634*** -2.946*** -2.561** -3.035*** -3.191*** -2.824*** -3.274*** 
 
(-2.25) (-1.99) (-2.42) (-2.52) (-2.26) (-2.69) (-3.07) (-2.56) (-2.87) (-3.37) (-2.86) (-3.16) 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs. 2,891 2,891 2,891 2,891 2,891 2,891 8,274 8,274 8,274 8,274 8,274 8,274 
Adj. R
2
 0.100 0.099 0.101 0.099 0.098 0.101 0.104 0.103 0.103 0.102 0.101 0.101 
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Table 6 
Robustness tests: Portfolio manager compensation structures and fund performance 
 
This table reports the results of several robustness tests on the relation between compensation structures and fund performance. We repeat the analysis of Tables 3 
and 4 except that we add Cremers and Petajisto’s (2009) active share measure as an additional control variable in Panel A; we use five-factor alphas (gross and 
net) and seven-factor alphas (gross and net) as dependent variables to control for fund’s liquidity exposure in Panel B; and we control for the average 
performance of all the funds in the family (excluding the fund itself) in Panel C. For the sake of brevity, we only report the coefficient estimates of the main 
variables of interest. Standard errors are clustered at the family level and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. We also perform F-tests to compare the 
coefficients of different compensation structures and report the F-test p-values at the bottom of the table. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Controlling for Cremers and Petajisto’s (2009) Active Share measure 
 Gross Four-Factor Alphat Net Four-Factor Alphat Gross Six-Factor Alphat Net Six-Factor Alphat 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Performance Payt-1 0.779*** 0.701** 0.806*** 0.732*** 1.131*** 1.082*** 1.147*** 1.104*** 
 
(2.94) (2.54) (3.02) (2.61) (3.65) (3.15) (3.67) (3.19) 
AUM Payt-1  -0.124  -0.140  -0.173  -0.200 
 
 (-0.42)  (-0.47)  (-0.68)  (-0.78) 
Advisor-Profits Pay t-1  -0.412  -0.395  -0.098  -0.087 
 
 (-1.59)  (-1.52)  (-0.44)  (-0.39) 
Fixed Salary t-1  -1.518  -1.550  -1.746  -1.797 
 
 (-1.26)  (-1.29)  (-1.32)  (-1.36) 
Active Share t-1 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (3.50) (3.43) (3.15) (3.10) (3.77) (3.70) (3.42) (3.36) 
Controlst-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs. 5,585 5,585 5,585 5,585 8,465 8,465 8,465 8,465 
Adj. R
2
 0.095 0.096 0.095 0.096 0.040 0.040 0.038 0.038 
F-tests   
Perf.= AUM  0.076  0.064  0.013  0.010 
Perf. = Profit  0.006  0.005  0.003  0.002 
Perf. = Fix  0.076  0.068  0.034  0.030 
Perf.=AUM=Profit   0.019  0.018  0.011  0.010 
Perf.=AUM=Profit=Fix  0.030  0.027  0.012  0.010 
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Panel B: Controlling for Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor 
 Gross Five-Factor Alphat Net Five-Factor Alphat Gross Seven-Factor Alphat Net Seven-Factor Alphat 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Performance Payt-1 0.688*** 0.562** 0.710*** 0.590** 0.728*** 0.709*** 0.748*** 0.734*** 
 
(2.61) (2.09) (2.69) (2.18) (3.26) (2.82) (3.36) (2.92) 
AUM Payt-1  -0.079  -0.102  -0.239  -0.262 
 
 (-0.25)  (-0.32)  (-1.29)  (-1.44) 
Advisor-Profits Pay t-1  -0.420  -0.402  -0.268*  -0.254 
 
 (-1.56)  (-1.49)  (-1.69)  (-1.63) 
Fixed Salary t-1  -2.163*  -2.211*  -1.268*  -1.304* 
  (-1.83)  (-1.87)  (-1.81)  (-1.86) 
Controlst-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs. 5,811 5,811 5,811 5,811 15,478 15,478 15,478 15,478 
Adj. R
2
 0.033 0.035 0.033 0.035 0.052 0.052 0.048 0.048 
F-tests   
Perf.= AUM  0.182  0.154  0.009  0.006 
Perf. = Profit  0.021  0.019  0.001  0.001 
Perf. = Fix  0.028  0.024  0.005  0.004 
Perf.=AUM=Profit  0.055  0.056  0.003  0.003 
Perf.=AUM=Profit=Fix  0.038  0.036  0.001  0.001 
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Panel C: Controlling for family average performance (excluding the fund itself) 
 Gross Four-Factor Alphat Net Four-Factor Alphat Gross Six-Factor Alphat Net Six-Factor Alphat 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Performance Payt-1 0.576** 0.544** 0.608*** 0.585** 0.436*** 0.436** 0.476*** 0.477*** 
 
(2.53) (2.37) (2.71) (2.58) (2.67) (2.37) (2.98) (2.66) 
AUM Payt-1  -0.153  -0.175  -0.231  -0.233* 
 
 (-0.56)  (-0.64)  (-1.64)  (-1.66) 
Advisor-Profits Pay t-1  -0.177  -0.156  -0.218*  -0.207* 
 
 (-0.75)  (-0.66)  (-1.85)  (-1.78) 
Fixed Salary t-1  -1.750  -1.764  -1.023  -1.025 
  (-0.76)  (-0.77)  (-1.56)  (-1.57) 
Family Average Alphat 0.495*** 0.492*** 0.497*** 0.495*** 0.505*** 0.502*** 0.508*** 0.505*** 
 (10.90) (10.89) (10.92) (10.92) (11.54) (11.39) (11.61) (11.46) 
Controlst-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Family FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs. 5,218 5,218 5,218 5,218 14,896 14,896 14,896 14,896 
Adj. R
2
 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.137 0.137 0.135 0.135 
F-tests   
Perf.= AUM  0.102  0.076  0.015  0.009 
Perf. = Profit  0.046  0.039  0.004  0.002 
Perf. = Fix  0.332  0.317  0.028  0.024 
Perf.=AUM=Profit  0.135  0.116  0.015  0.008 
Perf.=AUM=Profit=Fix  0.225   0.198   0.013   0.007 
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Table 7  
Robustness tests: Evaluation period and fund performance 
 
This table reports the results of several robustness tests on the relation between evaluation period and fund performance. We repeat the analysis of Table 5 except 
that we add Cremers and Petajisto’s (2009) active share measure as an additional control variable in Panel A; we use five-factor alphas (gross and net) and seven-
factor alphas (gross and net) as dependent variables to control for fund’s liquidity exposure in Panel B; and we control for the average performance of all the 
funds in the family (excluding the fund itself) in Panel C. In Panel D, we compare the evaluation period between the subsamples of funds with above- and below-
median tenure managers. In Panel E, we repeat the analysis of Table 5 with each of the subsample and test the difference between the coefficients of the 
evaluation period measures across the two subsamples. We interact evaluation period with an indicator variable, Short Tenure, that equals one if a fund’s 
manager tenure is below the median value and zero otherwise. For the sake of brevity, we only report the coefficient estimates of the main variables of interest. 
Standard errors are clustered at the family level and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Controlling for Cremers and Petajisto’s (2009) Active Share measure 
 Gross Four-Factor Alphat Net Four-Factor Alphat Gross Six-Factor Alphat Net Six-Factor Alphat 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Evaluation Period Meant-1 0.203*   0.197*   0.358***   0.350***   
 
(1.80)   (1.75)   (2.99)   (2.94)   
Evaluation Period Mint-1  -0.109   -0.113   0.071   0.065  
 
 (-0.90)   (-0.93)   (0.63)   (0.60)  
Evaluation Period Maxt-1   0.169***   0.167***   0.207***   0.204*** 
   (2.89)   (2.83)   (3.46)   (3.44) 
Active Sharet-1 0.018* 0.019* 0.017* 0.017* 0.017* 0.016 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.010 0.010 
 
(1.89) (1.94) (1.81) (1.73) (1.78) (1.65) (1.21) (1.38) (1.55) (1.01) (1.19) (1.32) 
Controlst-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs. 2,771 2,771 2,771 2,771 2,771 2,771 4,431 4,431 4,431 4,431 4,431 4,431 
Adj. R
2
 0.099 0.099 0.100 0.099 0.098 0.100 0.043 0.041 0.043 0.042 0.040 0.042 
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Panel B: Controlling for Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor 
 Gross Five-Factor Alphat Net Five-Factor Alphat Gross Seven-Factor Alphat Net Seven-Factor Alphat 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Evaluation Period Meant-1 0.155   0.149   0.303**   0.285**   
 
(1.32)   (1.25)   (2.61)   (2.50)   
Evaluation Period Mint-1  -0.211*   -0.215*   0.113   0.103  
 
 (-1.82)   (-1.83)   (1.20)   (1.14)  
Evaluation Period Maxt-1   0.172***   0.169***   0.135**   0.129** 
   (3.06)   (2.97)   (2.54)   (2.47) 
Controlst-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs. 2,891 2,891 2,891 2,891 2,891 2,891 8,274 8,274 8,274 8,274 8,274 8,274 
Adj. R
2
 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.059 0.057 0.058 0.055 0.053 0.054 
 
 
 
Panel C: Controlling for family average performance (excluding the fund itself) 
 Gross Four-Factor Alphat Net Four-Factor Alphat Gross Six-Factor Alphat Net Six-Factor Alphat 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Evaluation Period Meant-1 0.150   0.142   0.140**   0.134*   
 
(1.60)   (1.52)   (2.01)   (1.92)   
Evaluation Period Mint-1  -0.132   -0.131   0.051   0.053  
 
 (-1.42)   (-1.45)   (1.03)   (1.11)  
Evaluation Period Maxt-1   0.143***   0.137***   0.062*   0.058* 
   (3.28)   (3.16)   (1.88)   (1.73) 
Family Average Alphat 0.475*** 0.480*** 0.473*** 0.476*** 0.480*** 0.473*** 0.570*** 0.575*** 0.575*** 0.574*** 0.577*** 0.577*** 
 (6.20) (6.35) (6.22) (6.16) (6.31) (6.17) (6.69) (6.83) (6.79) (6.69) (6.82) (6.78) 
Controlst-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs. 2,821 2,821 2,821 2,821 2,821 2,821 8,233 8,233 8,233 8,233 8,233 8,233 
Adj. R
2
 0.141 0.141 0.142 0.141 0.141 0.142 0.138 0.138 0.138 0.137 0.136 0.136 
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Panel D: Evaluation period and portfolio manager tenure 
 Manager Tenure>=56 Months  Manager Tenure<56 Months  
Diff. in Mean 
(t-stat.) Variables Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev.  Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev.  
Evaluation Period Mean  5,005 3.03 3 1.19  5,578 3.10 3 1.24 
 
-0.07 
(-0.36) 
Evaluation Period Min 5,005 1.51 1 1.14  5,578 1.83 1 1.48  -0.32 
(-1.17) 
Evaluation Period Max 5,005 4.55 5 2.13  5,578 4.37 5 1.81  
0.18 
(1.09) 
 
 
Panel E: Evaluation period and fund performance - subsample analysis 
 Gross Four-Factor Alphat Net Four-Factor Alphat Gross Six-Factor Alphat Net Six-Factor Alphat 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Evaluation Period Meant-1 0.401***   0.399***   0.360***   0.349***   
 
(2.96)   (2.93)   (2.83)   (2.75)   
Evaluation Period Meant-1* 
Short Tenuret-1 
-0.305   -0.311   -0.123   -0.129   
(-1.43)   (-1.45)   (-0.87)   (-0.91)   
Evaluation Period Mint-1  0.032   0.030   0.252**   0.248**  
  (0.18)   (0.18)   (2.49)   (2.48)  
Evaluation Period Mint-1* 
Short Tenuret-1 
 -0.229   -0.231   -0.124   -0.132  
 (-0.96)   (-0.98)   (-1.12)   (-1.18)  
Evaluation Period Maxt-1   0.228***   0.227***   0.120*   0.115* 
   (3.24)   (3.21)   (1.89)   (1.82) 
Evaluation Period Maxt-1* 
Short Tenuret-1 
  -0.075   -0.077   -0.028   -0.028 
  (-0.66)   (-0.68)   (-0.37)   (-0.37) 
Short Tenuret-1 -1.621 -1.912 -1.951 -1.515 -1.816 -1.844 0.341 0.724 0.023 0.277 0.627 -0.027 
 
(-0.44) (-0.51) (-0.53) (-0.41) (-0.49) (-0.50) (0.14) (0.27) (0.01) (0.11) (0.24) (-0.01) 
Controlst-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs. 2,891 2,891 2,891 2,891 2,891 2,891 8,274 8,274 8,274 8,274 8,274 8,274 
Adj. R
2
 0.102 0.100 0.103 0.101 0.0995 0.102 0.110 0.109 0.109 0.108 0.108 0.107 
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Table 8 
Management talent vs. effort induction 
 
This table tabulates the results of repeating our analysis of Tables 3, 4, and 5 after controlling proxies for manager’s ability. We use two variables to proxy for 
managerial ability: (i) average SAT score of the manager’s undergraduate institution, (ii) an indicator variable that equals one if the manager has an MBA degree 
from a top business school (i.e., average GMAT score>700), zero otherwise. In addition, we include manager industry experience (i.e., the number of years the 
manager has worked in the mutual fund industry) as an additional control variable. Panel A (B) reports the results on the relation between compensation 
structures (evaluation period) and fund performance. For the sake of brevity, we only report the coefficient estimates of the main variables of interest. Standard 
errors are clustered at the family level and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. In columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) of Panel A, we also perform F-tests to compare 
the coefficients of different compensation structures and report the F-test p-values at the bottom of the table. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
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Panel A: Compensation structures and fund performance 
 Gross Four-Factor Alphat Net Four-Factor Alphat Gross Six-Factor Alphat Net Six-Factor Alphat 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Performance Payt-1 0.764*** 0.755** 0.791*** 0.787*** 0.878*** 0.924*** 0.901*** 0.949*** 
 
(2.71) (2.51) (2.81) (2.61) (3.80) (3.59) (3.90) (3.69) 
AUM Payt-1  -0.304  -0.321  -0.375*  -0.390* 
 
 (-0.96)  (-1.00)  (-1.72)  (-1.82) 
Advisor-Profits Pay t-1  -0.513*  -0.494*  -0.267  -0.250 
 
 (-1.89)  (-1.81)  (-1.61)  (-1.51) 
Fixed Salary t-1  -0.903  -0.949  -0.876  -0.904 
 
 (-0.88)  (-0.93)  (-1.15)  (-1.19) 
SAT 0.036 0.046 0.036 0.045 0.152** 0.161** 0.153** 0.162** 
 (0.36) (0.45) (0.36) (0.45) (2.38) (2.53) (2.40) (2.56) 
Top MBA 0.472* 0.487* 0.486* 0.500* 0.333* 0.329* 0.313* 0.309 
 (1.84) (1.88) (1.90) (1.93) (1.75) (1.71) (1.66) (1.61) 
Log Manager Experiencet-1 -0.057 -0.073 -0.080 -0.095 -0.251* -0.249* -0.252* -0.251* 
 (-0.26) (-0.32) (-0.36) (-0.42) (-1.72) (-1.69) (-1.73) (-1.70) 
Controlst-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs. 4,956 4,956 4,956 4,956 12,111 12,111 12,111 12,111 
Adj. R
2
 0.089 0.090 0.089 0.090 0.098 0.098 0.095 0.096 
F-tests   
Perf.= AUM  0.034  0.028  0.001  0.000 
Perf. = Profit  0.003  0.003  0.000  0.000 
Perf. = Fix  0.109  0.091  0.016  0.013 
Perf.=AUM=Profit  0.013  0.012  0.000  0.000 
Perf.=AUM=Profit=Fix  0.024   0.021   0.000   0.000 
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Panel B: Evaluation period and fund performance 
 Gross Four-Factor Alphat Net Four-Factor Alphat Gross Six-Factor Alphat Net Six-Factor Alphat 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Evaluation Period Meant-1 0.288**   0.280**   0.349***   0.337***   
 
(2.53)   (2.43)   (3.31)   (3.20)   
Evaluation Period Mint-1  0.004   -0.002   0.256***   0.246***  
 
 (0.04)   (-0.02)   (3.09)   (3.06)  
Evaluation Period Maxt-1   0.176***   0.173***   0.116**   0.112** 
   (3.14)   (3.06)   (2.12)   (2.07) 
SAT 0.064 0.090 0.037 0.066 0.091 0.039 0.077 0.093 0.100 0.077 0.092 0.099 
 (0.42) (0.60) (0.24) (0.42) (0.60) (0.25) (0.95) (1.15) (1.25) (0.96) (1.15) (1.26) 
Top MBA 0.622* 0.677** 0.637** 0.628** 0.683** 0.643** 0.287 0.298 0.328 0.272 0.282 0.312 
 (1.97) (2.10) (2.02) (2.00) (2.13) (2.04) (1.17) (1.19) (1.37) (1.12) (1.15) (1.33) 
Log Manager Experiencet-1 -0.075 -0.012 -0.017 -0.092 -0.027 -0.035 -0.254 -0.273 -0.239 -0.251 -0.270 -0.237 
 
(-0.29) (-0.04) (-0.07) (-0.35) (-0.11) (-0.14) (-1.25) (-1.32) (-1.15) (-1.23) (-1.29) (-1.13) 
Controlst-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs. 2,416 2,416 2,416 2,416 2,416 2,416 6,303 6,303 6,303 6,303 6,303 6,303 
Adj. R
2
 0.100 0.098 0.100 0.101 0.099 0.101 0.120 0.119 0.118 0.118 0.117 0.117 
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Table 9 
Portfolio manager compensation structures and fund risk shifting 
 
This table presents estimation results of the impact of various portfolio manager compensation structures on fund 
risk-shifting behavior. The dependent variable is Risk Shift Ratio, constructed as in Eq. (3). We use the diversified 
domestic equity fund sample in this analysis. All dependent and independent variables are defined as in Tables 1 and 
2. Standard errors are clustered at the family level and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. In column (2), we also 
perform F-tests to compare the coefficients of different compensation structures and report the F-test p-values at the 
bottom of the table. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
 
 Intra-year Risk Shift Ratio 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Performance Payt-1 -0.029** -0.031**    
 (-2.29) (-2.24)    
AUM Payt-1  0.001    
  (0.19)    
Advisor-Profits Pay t-1  -0.004    
  (-0.75)    
Fixed Salary t-1  -0.020    
  (-1.41)    
Evaluation Period Meant-1   -0.004*   
   (-1.84)   
Evaluation Period Mint-1    0.002  
    (1.24)  
Evaluation Period Maxt-1     -0.003** 
 
    (-2.30) 
Log Family Size t-1 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.001 0.002** 
 (3.35) (3.22) (2.07) (1.06) (2.05) 
Subadviser t-1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
 (-0.09) (-0.01) (-0.89) (-0.60) (-0.77) 
Owner t-1 -0.013** -0.012** -0.015*** -0.014** -0.017*** 
 
(-2.13) (-2.16) (-2.68) (-2.39) (-2.96) 
Team Mgmt. t-1 -0.011* -0.011* -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 
 
(-1.88) (-1.88) (-1.23) (-0.46) (-1.16) 
Log Manager Tenure t-1 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* 
 
(-1.48) (-1.47) (-1.88) (-1.78) (-1.67) 
Log Fund Size t-1 0.003** 0.003** 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 
 
(2.13) (2.08) (1.89) (1.86) (1.87) 
Log Fund Age t-1 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(-1.36) (-1.35) (-0.76) (-0.81) (-0.66) 
Expenset-1 -0.018** -0.018** -0.013 -0.012 -0.014* 
 
(-2.01) (-2.02) (-1.62) (-1.55) (-1.81) 
Log Turnover t-1 0.004 0.004 0.005* 0.006* 0.005 
 
(0.90) (0.99) (1.71) (1.79) (1.42) 
Net Flows t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.82) (0.80) (0.35) (0.30) (0.42) 
Performance Adv. Fee t-1 -0.019** -0.019** -0.003 -0.008 -0.007 
 
(-2.22) (-2.18) (-0.62) (-1.29) (-1.20) 
Coles Incentive Rate t-1 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.013 0.008 0.012 
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(2.72) (2.81) (1.32) (0.85) (1.30) 
Risk Shift Ratiot-1 0.148 0.148 -0.012 -0.011 -0.014 
 (1.57) (1.57) (-0.34) (-0.30) (-0.38) 
Constant 0.948*** 0.951*** 1.080*** 1.071*** 1.087*** 
 
(15.16) (15.46) (27.47) (25.88) (26.83) 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs. 5,346 5,346 2,676 2,676 2,676 
Adj. R
2
 0.239 0.239 0.296 0.295 0.297 
F-tests      
Fix= Perf.  0.510    
Fix = AUM  0.167    
Fix = Profit  0.224    
Fix=Perf.=AUM=Profit  0.087    
Perf.=AUM  0.047    
Perf.= Profit  0.017    
Perf.=AUM=Profit  0.054    
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Table A1  
Summary statistics of compensation structures of diversified domestic equity funds 
 
This table reports the distribution of compensation structures (Panel A), further breakdown of non-fixed salary 
(Panel B), summary statistics of evaluation periods (Panel C), and correlation coefficient matrix of the main 
variables of portfolio manager compensation structures (Panel D). The sample consists of diversified domestic 
equity funds, with 5,845 fund-year observations over the period 2006-2011. The variable Fixed Salary is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the portfolio manager receives a fixed amount of compensation from the advisor, 
zero otherwise. Performance Pay is a dummy variable that is set to one if the bonus is tied to the investment 
performance of the fund, zero otherwise; AUM Pay is an indicator variable that equals one if portfolio manager 
compensation is tied to the fund’s assets under management, zero otherwise; Advisor-Profits Pay is a dummy 
variable that is set to one if the portfolio manager’s compensation depends on the advisor’s profits, zero otherwise; 
Evaluation Period Mean is the average number of years over which investment performance is measured for 
performance-based pay; most funds report multiple evaluation windows, Evaluation Period Min is the shortest 
evaluation window, Evaluation Period Max is the longest evaluation window, and Evaluation Period Median is the 
median evaluation window if there are three or more evaluation periods disclosed. For funds that have multiple 
reported evaluation windows, we calculate Evaluation Period Mean as the mean of Evaluation Period Min and 
Evaluation Period Max. P-values are in brackets in Panel D. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics of compensation structures 
  # of Obs. % of Sample 
Total  5,845 100% 
Fixed Salary 96 1.6% 
Non-fixed Salary 5,749 98.4% 
    Performance Pay 4,415 75.5% 
    AUM Pay 1,252 21.4% 
    Advisor-Profits Pay 3,047 52.1% 
 
 
 
Panel B: Further breakdown of non-fixed salary 
Performance 
Pay 
AUM 
Pay 
Advisor-Profits 
Pay # of Obs. 
% of Non-fixed 
Salary Sample 
1 0 0 1,830 31.8% 
1 1 0 566 9.8% 
1 0 1 1,422 24.7% 
1 1 1 597 10.4% 
0 1 0 60 1.0% 
0 0 1 999 17.4% 
0 1 1 29 0.5% 
0 0 0 246 4.3% 
Total Non-fixed Salary 5,749 100% 
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Panel C: Summary statistics of evaluation period 
Variables (years) Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Evaluation Period Mean 3,704 3.08 3 1.20 0.25 6.5 
Evaluation Period Min 3,704 1.66 1 1.30 0.25 5 
Evaluation Period Max 3,704 4.49 5 1.99 0.25 10 
Evaluation Period Median 1,713 3.29 3 0.87 1 5 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Correlation matrix 
  
Fixed 
Salary  
Performance 
Pay 
AUM 
Pay 
Advisor-
Profits Pay 
Evaluation 
Period 
Mean 
Fixed Salary  1.00     
 
     
Performance Pay -0.23 1.00    
 
[0.00]     
AUM Pay -0.07 0.21 1.00   
 
[0.00] [0.00]    
Advisor-Profits Pay -0.13 -0.23 -0.02 1.00  
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.09]   
Evaluation Period Mean . 0.04 -0.11 -0.37 1.00 
  . [0.03] [0.00] [0.00]  
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Table A2 
Summary statistics of compensation structures by year 
 
This table reports the distribution of compensation structures (Panel A) and summary statistics of evaluation periods 
(Panel B) by year. The sample period is 2006 to 2011. All variables are defined in Table A1.  
 
 
Panel A: Yearly statistics of compensation structures 
Year Fixed Salary 
Performance 
Pay AUM Pay 
Advisor Profits 
Pay # Obs. 
2006 1.4% 80.5% 19.6% 47.4% 2,578 
2007 1.6% 79.6% 20.2% 48.8% 2,670 
2008 1.1% 80.7% 19.9% 48.5% 2,559 
2009 1.3% 79.3% 20.0% 49.6% 2,646 
2010 1.3% 77.9% 17.4% 49.8% 2,606 
2011 1.6% 77.5% 16.5% 48.4% 2,546 
All 1.4% 79.2% 18.9% 48.7% 15,605 
 
 
 
Panel B: Yearly statistics of evaluation period 
Year 
Evaluation 
Period Mean 
Evaluation 
Period Min 
Evaluation 
Period Max 
Evaluation 
Period Median # Obs. 
2006 3.00 1.67 4.34 3.22 1,797 
2007 3.02 1.69 4.35 3.24 1,852 
2008 3.06 1.66 4.47 3.22 1,779 
2009 3.06 1.63 4.48 3.23 1,816 
2010 3.12 1.72 4.53 3.25 1,693 
2011 3.14 1.71 4.57 3.26 1,646 
All 3.07 1.68 4.45 3.24 10,583 
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Table A3  
Summary statistics of alternative performance measures 
 
This table reports the summary statistics of several alternative alpha estimates that we use in the robustness tests. 
First, we use daily return data in each year to estimate the following in-sample alpha measures: Net Four-Factor 
(Six-Factor) Alpha and Gross Four-Factor (Six-Factor) Alpha. To capture any effect of infrequent trading on daily 
fund returns (e.g., Scholes and Williams, 1977; Dimson, 1979), we include both contemporaneous and lagged daily 
factor returns. We annualize the daily alpha estimate by (1+daily alpha)252 –1. Second, Net (Gross) Benchmark-
Adjusted Alpha is computed by regressing 12 monthly excess net-of-fee (gross-of-fee) returns of a fund in a year on 
the excess returns of its Morningstar-assigned benchmark index (i.e., Morningstar Category Index). All alpha 
measures are annualized and winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
 
 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. 1st 99th Obs. 
       
Alphas estimated in-sample using daily return data 
Net Four-Factor Alpha (in % per year) -0.537 -0.574 5.795 -16.931 14.752 5,845 
Net Six-Factor Alpha (in % per year) -0.119 -0.242 7.869 -23.983 26.597 15,605 
Gross Four-Factor Alpha (in % per year) 0.606 0.494 5.865 -15.824 16.058 5,845 
Gross Six-Factor Alpha (in % per year) 0.929 0.662 7.953 -22.910 28.123 15,605 
       
Benchmark-adjusted alphas       
Net Benchmark-Adjusted Alpha (in % per year) -0.486 -0.345 6.102 -21.195 17.616 15,540 
Gross Benchmark-Adjusted Alpha (in % per year) 0.590 0.524 6.072 -19.842 18.767 15,540 
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Table A4  
Robustness tests: Four-factor and six-factor alphas estimated using daily return data 
 
This table repeats the analysis of Tables 3, 4, and 5 except using four- and six-factor alphas estimated in sample each year using daily return data as the 
dependent variable. The dependent variables are defined in Table A3. For the sake of brevity, we only report the coefficient estimates of the main variables of 
interest. Panel A (B) reports the results on the relation between compensation structures (evaluation period) and fund performance. Standard errors are clustered 
at the family level and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. In columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) of Panel A, we also perform F-tests to compare the coefficients of 
different compensation structures and report the F-test p-values at the bottom of the table. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Performance-based pay and fund performance 
 Gross Four-Factor Alphat Net Four-Factor Alphat Gross Six-Factor Alphat Net Six-Factor Alphat 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Performance Payt-1 0.613** 0.544** 0.632** 0.570** 0.456** 0.460** 0.471** 0.478** 
 
(2.42) (2.19) (2.55) (2.35) (2.29) (2.11) (2.37) (2.20) 
AUM Payt-1  -0.290  -0.305  -0.384**  -0.399** 
 
 (-1.02)  (-1.08)  (-2.27)  (-2.36) 
Advisor-Profits Pay t-1  -0.265  -0.245  -0.262*  -0.245* 
 
 (-1.14)  (-1.07)  (-1.86)  (-1.76) 
Fixed Salary t-1  -2.517**  -2.515**  -1.532**  -1.551** 
 
 (-2.45)  (-2.48)  (-2.42)  (-2.46) 
Controlst-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs. 5,814 5,814 5,814 5,814 15,483 15,483 15,483 15,483 
Adj. R
2
 0.0736 0.0760 0.0733 0.0758 0.178 0.179 0.180 0.181 
F-tests   
Perf.= AUM  0.053  0.041  0.007  0.005 
Perf. = Profit  0.025  0.021  0.004  0.003 
Perf. = Fix  0.005  0.004  0.002  0.001 
Perf.=AUM=Profit   0.065  0.053  0.010  0.008 
Perf.=AUM=Profit=Fix  0.020   0.016   0.002   0.001 
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Panel B: Evaluation period and fund performance 
 Gross Four-Factor Alphat Net Four-Factor Alphat Gross Six-Factor Alphat Net Six-Factor Alphat 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Evaluation Period Meant-1 0.190*   0.181*   0.304***   0.286***   
 
(1.77)   (1.67)   (3.39)   (3.21)   
Evaluation Period Mint-1  -0.186*   -0.189*   0.052   0.043  
 
 (-1.66)   (-1.67)   (0.61)   (0.52)  
Evaluation Period Maxt-1   0.185***   0.180***   0.162***   0.154*** 
   (3.19)   (3.09)   (3.77)   (3.65) 
Controlst-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs. 2,891 2,891 2,891 2,891 2,891 2,891 8,276 8,276 8,276 8,276 8,276 8,276 
Adj. R
2
 0.082 0.082 0.084 0.079 0.080 0.082 0.205 0.203 0.205 0.205 0.204 0.205 
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Table A5 
Robustness tests: Benchmark-adjusted alphas using Morningstar-assigned benchmarks  
 
This table repeats the analysis of Tables 3, 4, and 5 except using gross and net benchmark-adjusted alphas as the 
dependent variable. The dependent variables are defined in Table A3. For the sake of brevity, we only report the 
coefficient estimates of the main variables of interest. Panel A (B) reports the results on the relation between 
compensation structures (evaluation period) and fund performance. Standard errors are clustered at the family level 
and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. In columns (2) and (4) of Panel A, we also perform F-tests to compare 
the coefficients of different compensation structures and report the F-test p-values at the bottom of the table. The 
superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Performance-based pay and fund performance 
 Gross Bench.-Adj. Alphat Net Bench.-Adj. Alphat 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Performance  Payt-1 0.501*** 0.467** 0.527*** 0.482** 
 (2.60) (2.22) (2.69) (2.25) 
AUM Payt-1  -0.103  -0.080 
  (-0.64)  (-0.50) 
Advisor-Profits Pay t-1  -0.171  -0.149 
  (-1.09)  (-0.94) 
Fixed Salary t-1  -0.964  -1.048 
  (-1.36)  (-1.45) 
Controls t-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs. 15,462 15,462 15,462 15,462 
R
2
 0.096 0.097 0.100 0.100 
F-tests     
Perf.= AUM  0.068   0.075 
Perf. = Profit  0.007  0.008 
Perf. = Fix  0.045  0.035 
Perf.=AUM=Profit  0.026  0.030 
Perf.=AUM=Profit=Fix  0.022   0.021 
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Panel B: Evaluation period and fund performance 
 Gross Bench.-Adj. Alphat Net Bench.-Adj. Alphat 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Evaluation Period Meant-1 0.360***   0.333***   
 (4.35)   (3.89)   
Evaluation Period Mint-1  0.024   -0.002  
  (0.22)   (-0.02)  
Evaluation Period Maxt-1   0.207***   0.202*** 
 
  (4.60)   (4.41) 
Controls t-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs. 8,276 8,276 8,276 8,276 8,276 8,276 
R
2
 0.123 0.120 0.124 0.127 0.124 0.128 
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Table A6 
Robustness tests: Evaluation period and fund performance without conditioning on clearly stated benchmarks 
 
This table repeats the tests in Table 5 except that we include all funds that report the evaluation period, regardless of whether a clear benchmark is stated. For the 
sake of brevity, we only report the coefficient estimates of the main variables of interest. Standard errors are clustered at the family level and t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Gross Four-Factor Alphat Net Four-Factor Alphat Gross Six-Factor Alphat Net Six-Factor Alphat 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Evaluation Period Meant-1 0.043   0.035   0.188*   0.173*   
 
(0.38)   (0.31)   (1.85)   (1.70)   
Evaluation Period Mint-1  -0.114   -0.121   0.103   0.096  
 
 (-0.97)   (-1.02)   (1.22)   (1.17)  
Evaluation Period Maxt-1   0.061   0.058   0.076   0.070 
   (0.99)   (0.94)   (1.62)   (1.49) 
Controlst-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs. 3,683 3,683 3,683 3,683 3,683 3,683 10,524 10,524 10,524 10,524 10,524 10,524 
Adj. R
2
 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.109 0.109 0.109 
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Table A7 
Determinants of portfolio manager compensation structures 
 
This table reports the OLS regression estimates of the determinants of various portfolio manager compensation 
structures. Specifically, the dependent variable is Performance Pay in column (1), AUM Pay in column (2), Advisor-
Profits Pay in column (3), Fixed Salary in column (4), and Evaluation Period Mean in column (5). All independent 
variables are defined as in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered at the family level and t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
 
  Performance 
Payt 
AUM 
Payt 
Advisor-
Profits Payt 
Fixed 
Salaryt 
Evaluation  
Period Meant  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log Manager Tenure t-1 -0.012 -0.008 0.010 -0.001 -0.002 
 (-1.44) (-0.68) (0.47) (-0.30) (-0.04) 
Log Family Size t-1 0.057*** -0.013 -0.032** -0.012*** 0.262*** 
 
(6.75) (-1.06) (-2.03) (-3.64) (3.74) 
Subadviser t-1 -0.080 0.008 0.138** 0.005 -0.123 
 
(-1.57) (0.17) (2.37) (0.66) (-0.81) 
Owner t-1 -0.328*** 0.011 0.352*** -0.007 -0.061 
 
(-4.74) (0.16) (6.45) (-0.75) (-0.17) 
Team Mgmt. t-1 0.027 0.046 0.020 -0.011* -0.393*** 
 
(0.83) (1.14) (0.40) (-1.85) (-2.67) 
Log Fund Size t-1 -0.009 0.004 0.005 -0.002 0.062** 
 
(-1.15) (0.51) (0.45) (-1.00) (2.37) 
Log Fund Age t-1 -0.009 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.024 
 
(-0.70) (-0.05) (-0.18) (-0.20) (0.45) 
Expenset-1 0.069 0.062 0.025 -0.005 -0.196 
 
(1.55) (1.54) (0.48) (-0.69) (-1.10) 
Log Turnover t-1 0.017 0.004 0.005 0.001 -0.036 
 
(1.29) (0.33) (0.32) (0.30) (-0.73) 
Net Flows t-1 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001** -0.002 
 
(-0.28) (-1.03) (-1.41) (-2.19) (-0.33) 
Performance Adv. Fee t-1 -0.023 0.029 -0.113 0.010 0.131 
 
(-0.45) (0.33) (-1.58) (1.22) (0.41) 
Coles Incentive Rate t-1 -0.048 0.055 0.127 -0.065 0.944** 
 
(-0.65) (0.45) (0.88) (-1.33) (2.45) 
Constant 0.279* 0.234* 0.597*** 0.149*** 0.587 
 
(1.74) (1.82) (2.97) (3.19) (0.76) 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs. 15,527 15,527 15,527 15,527 10,562 
Adj. R
2
 0.260 0.020 0.147 0.058 0.326 
 
 
 
  
 12 
 
Table A8  
Robustness tests: Compensation structures and intra-year risk shift difference   
 
This table repeats the analysis on intra-year risk-shifting behavior of Table 9 except that we use an alternative risk-
shifting measure: intra-year risk shift difference. Rather than taking the ratio, this alternative measure takes the 
difference of intended portfolio risk in the second half of the year and the realized portfolio risk in the first half of 
the year. For the sake of brevity, we only report the coefficient estimates of the main variables of interest. Standard 
errors are clustered at the family level and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. In column (2), we also perform F-
tests to compare the coefficients of different compensation structures and report the F-test p-values at the bottom of 
the table. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Intra-year Risk Shift Difference 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Performance Payt-1 -0.070** -0.075**    
 (-2.14) (-2.14)    
AUM Payt-1  0.006    
  (0.43)    
Advisor-Profits Pay t-1  -0.010    
  (-0.69)    
Fixed Salary t-1  -0.038    
  (-0.92)    
Evaluation Period Meant-1   -0.012*   
   (-1.69)   
Evaluation Period Mint-1    0.010**  
    (2.05)  
Evaluation Period Maxt-1     -0.011** 
 
    (-2.53) 
Controlst-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objective & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of Obs. 5,346 5,346 2,676 2,676 2,676 
Adj. R
2
 0.297 0.297 0.385 0.385 0.386 
F-tests      
Fix= Perf.  0.423    
Fix = AUM  0.323    
Fix = Profit  0.468    
Fix=Perf.=AUM=Profit   0.196    
Perf.=AUM  0.052    
Perf.= Profit  0.036    
Perf.=AUM=Profit  0.106    
 
